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L 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
as it is an appeal from a final judgment of the district court which has been transferred by 
the Supreme Court. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Has Graham failed to demonstrate that any of the trial court's findings 
which he attacks in his brief are clearly erroneous? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will not disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact 
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. Bonneville Distributing 
Co. v. Green River Dev. Assocs., 2007 UT App. 175, \ 18, 164 P.3d 433. 
2. Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court's award of punitive 
damages was clearly erroneous. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The court will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact 
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. See, Bonneville, supra. 
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3. Is Graham barred from raising the argument for the first time on appeal that 
paragraph 9 of the Agreement between the parties does not permit an award of attorney's 
fees in this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue presents a question of law. See, Moore v. Smith, 
2007 UT App. 101,124, 158 P.3d 562. 
a. Even if Graham is entitled to raise the issue set forth in paragraph 3 
above for the first time on appeal, has Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court's 
determination that Burton Lumber is entitled to attorney's fees under paragraph 9 
constituted error. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue raises an issue of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See, Canyon Meadows Homeowners Assoc, v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT 
App. 414,^7, 40 P.3d 1148. 
b. Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the amount of attorney's fees 
awarded by the trial court is clearly erroneous? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will not disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact 
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. See, Bonneville, supra. 
4. Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that Burton 
Lumber is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
2 
56 because Graham's claims and defenses in this action were without merit and asserted 
in bad faith was clearly erroneous? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court will not disturb the trial court's Findings of Fact 
unless Graham demonstrates the findings are clearly erroneous. See, Bonneville, supra. 
5. Has Graham failed to demonstrate that the determination made by the trial 
court on summary judgment that section 7.4 of the Agreement is not unconscionable 
constituted error? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court reviews a summary judgment for correctness. 
Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, \ 14, 79 P.3d 922. 
6. Is Burton Lumber entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs incurred 
on appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue raises a question of law. Utah Dep't. of Social 
Services v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197-1198 (Utah App. 1991). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES RULES AND REGULATIONS 
None. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case And Course of Proceedings Below. 
In March 2001, Burton Lumber acquried Graham's wall panel business, Advanced 
Homes Systems ("AHS"), and hired Graham as General Manager of the wall panel plant 
as an at-will employee. [Pi's Ex. 5; Finding 3] In August 2001, Burton Lumber 
discovered that Graham had stolen a Hamlet Homes check belonging to Burton Lumber 
in the amount of $7,293 and then lied about the check to conceal his theft. [Findings 11-
18] Accordingly, on August 28, 2001, Burton Lumber terminated Graham's employment. 
[Finding 18] Under the Agreement pursuant to which Burton Lumber purchased 
Graham's business, Graham was entitled to receive 50% of the net profits earned by the 
business during 2001, 2002 and 2003. [Pi's Ex. 5] However, upon termination of his 
employment, Graham's right to receive a share of profits (none were ever earned) 
terminated. [Id.$7A] 
After Graham's termination, Burton Lumber learned of other dishonest conduct 
committed by Graham and commenced this action to recover the amount owed by 
Graham. [R. 13] Graham filed an answer and counterclaim. [R. 29] Graham later filed 
an amended counterclaim. [R. 209] Burton Lumber subsequently filed an Amended 
Complaint. [R. 697] 
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In August 2003, Burton Lumber filed a motion for partial summary judgment. [R. 
1071] On January 12, 2004, Judge Claudia Laycock issued her ruling granting the motion 
for partial summary judgment with respect to Graham's counterclaims for 
unconscionability and fraud. [R. 2382] Thereafter, Partial Summary Judgment was 
entered by Judge Fred D. Howard, to whom the case had been assigned. [R. 2390] 
The remaining claims of the parties were tried to the court over eight days 
commencing November 15, 2004. The trial court then issued its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law [R. 2978] and entered Judgment [R. 2981] in favor of Burton 
Lumber on its Amended Complaint (except for its fraud and improper reimbursement 
claims) and dismissed all of Graham's counterclaims. The trial court also ruled that 
Burton Lumber was entitled to attorney's fees and punitive damages in amounts to be 
later determined. [Id.] 
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, attorney's fees were left for resolution after 
the court had decided the claims of the parties. An evidentiary hearing on attorney's fees 
and punitive damages was held on June 29, 2006. [R. 3112 & 3354] The trial court then 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 3334] and a Supplemental 
Judgment [R. 3336] awarding Burton Lumber attorney's fees in the amount of 
$164,461.25 and punitive damages in the amount of $34,000. [R. 3334-3336] The 
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Supplemental Judgment was entered on September 6, 2006. Graham filed his Notice of 
Appeal on October 5, 2006. [R. 3343] 
Graham filed his original 209 page Appellant's Brief on July 6, 2007, together 
with a motion for overlength brief. This court struck Graham's brief and denied the 
motion. Graham subsequently filed a 189 page brief which improperly incorporated 
argument and a 58 page statement of 122 issues, which this court also struck. Finally, 
Graham filed a 113 page brief which incorporated the same statement of issues. The 
court declined to strike this brief, but ruled Burton Lumber need only respond to the 
arguments properly raised and briefed in Graham's argument section. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Without saying so, and without identifying and dealing with the trial court's 
specific findings, Graham's brief challenges almost all of the trial court's Findings of 
Fact without even attempting to marshal the overwhelming evidence supporting those 
findings.1 Accordingly, as demonstrated in section A of the Argument section below, the 
court assumes the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, Burton 
1
 Indeed, Graham fails to even include a copy of the Findings of Fact in his 
Addendum as required. Instead, Graham, incredibly enough, includes 21 unreceived 
exhibits in his Addendum without even arguing that these exhibits were erroneously 
excluded at trial. Obviously, the court should not consider these unreceived exhibits. 
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Lumber quotes below the relevant findings (which are included in Addenda A & B) and 
provides record citations to evidence which supports each finding:2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Burton Lumber's Purchase of the Wall Panel Plant 
1. Graham owned and operated as a sole proprietorship a wall panel business 
in Provo, Utah that he started in 1995. Graham did business under the name of Advanced 
Home Systems ("AHS"). [R. 3348 at pp. 1680 & 1685] 
2. AHS manufactured wall panels for residential housing at AHS's plant. The 
wall panels would then be installed at the job site by subcontractors. [Id. at 1680; R. 
3343 at pp. 364-365; R. 3344 at pp. 120-121] 
3. Burton Lumber acquired Graham's wall panel business pursuant to an 
Agreement (the "Agreement") effective February 28, 2001. [Pi's Ex. 5] [R. 3344 at p. 
99] The Agreement closed on March 19, 2001, at which time Burton Lumber took over 
ownership and operations and Graham became General Manager of the wall panel plant. 
[R. 3344 at pp. 112-121; Pi's Exs. 7, 9 & 10] Under the express terms of the Agreement, 
Graham was an employee-at-will and could be terminated without cause at any time. 
Graham also signed a separate acknowledgment so stating. [Ex B to Pi's Ex. 5] [R. 3344 
at p. 104-105] 
4. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to pay 
Graham $54,175.00 for the fixed assets of the business. [Pi's Exs. 5 & 7; R. 3344 at pp. 
102 & 113-114] Burton Lumber also paid Graham approximately $4,400.00 for his 
inventory. [Pi's Ex. 9; R. 3344 at pp. 114-115] Burton Lumber also agreed to pay 
Graham a $120,000.00 salary (which included a guaranteed $15,000 quarterly bonus) and 
fifty percent of any future net profits earned by Burton Lumber in the wall panel business 
during 2001, 2002 and 2003 up to a maximum purchase price of $500,000.00. [Pis's Ex. 
5} 
2
 The court cited a number of supporting exhibits in its findings. The record 
citations now provided by Burton Lumber are set forth in italics. 
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5. Graham actively negotiated the provisions of the Agreement with Burton 
Lumber. For example, Graham refused to agree to a non-competition provision unless he 
was paid substantial additional compensation for an agreement not to compete. Burton 
Lumber refused to pay additional compensation and a non-competition provision was 
deleted from the final Agreement. [R. 3344 at pp. 95-96 & 104-106; R. 3350 at pp. 1965-
1966] 
6. In negotiating the Agreement, Graham was advised both by an attorney and 
aCPA. [R. 3350 at pp. 1965-1966] 
Graham's Misrepresentations re. Profits 
7. During negotiations of the Agreement, Graham represented to Burton 
Lumber that he had earned $250,000 a year net profits from AHS. . . .[R. 3344 at p. 97; R. 
3343 at p. 434] 
8. During negotiation of the Agreement, Burton Lumber requested that 
Graham provide financial statements to substantiate the profits he had earned operating 
AHS. Graham said he would do so, but then told Burton Lumber that his accountant was 
behind and financial statements were not yet prepared. Graham did not provide Burton 
Lumber with any financial statements or other financial documentation to substantiate his 
representations as to the profitability of AHS. [R. 3344 at pp. 97-100] 
9. The only documents that Graham has that would substantiate the profits 
AHS had earned are his tax returns. Nevertheless, Graham refused for many months after 
Burton Lumber requested production of the tax returns in this case to produce any of his 
tax returns. [R. 595-596] Graham only produced his tax returns after Judge Claudia 
Laycock granted Burton Lumber's motion to compel, ordered Graham to produce them 
and awarded sanctions against him for his refusal to produce the tax returns. Graham's 
tax returns reflect that he never earned any profits from AHS over and above a meager 
salary for his labor. His income from AHS ranged from a high of $33,582.00 in 1995 to a 
low of $7,384.00 in 1998. For 2000, his income was $27,434.00. [Pi's Exs. 47 thru 52] 
The court finds in accordance with the testimony of Burton Lumber's expert, Scott Stuart, 
whose testimony the court finds persuasive, that Graham's wall panel plant business was 
unprofitable for the six years prior to Burton Lumber's purchase of the business and that 
the business had no value other than the value of its fixed assets at the time Burton 
Lumber purchased the business. [R. 3345 at pp. 687-689] 
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10. Graham's misrepresentations regarding the profitability of his business 
were material and were relied upon by Burton Lumber in purchasing Graham's business. 
However, given all the circumstances, including Burton Lumber's resources, business 
experience, sophistication and opportunity, its reliance upon such misrepresentations was 
not reasonable. Instead of waiting for the requested verification of Graham's represented 
profits, Burton Lumber completed the transaction relying upon Graham's representations 
and its own limited research into the profitability of the wall panel business. Burton 
Lumber made no further attempts to verify the profitability of the business until after the 
lawsuit was commenced. Burton Lumber had every opportunity to discover Graham's 
fraud by reviewing Graham's financial records. 
Graham's Theft of the Hamlet Check 
11. Hamlet Homes ("Hamlet") was one of the Burton Lumber wall panel 
plant's largest customers. After Burton Lumber acquired AHS, Hamlet continued to send 
Purchase Orders for wall panels to AHS and to make its checks for payment of the wall 
panels to AHS. Graham would then pick up the checks from Hamlet's office and endorse 
them over to Burton Lumber. [R. 3344 at pp. 123, 207 & 210] 
12. As of late July 2001, Burton Lumber's records reflected that Hamlet had 
failed to make payment on two Burton Lumber invoices, Nos. 2800092 and 2800093, for 
wall panels supplied for lots 20 and 22, Kelvin Grove Subdivision in Springville. Burton 
Lumber contacted Hamlet concerning these invoices. Hamlet informed Burton Lumber 
that it had in fact paid the invoices. Hamlet provided Burton Lumber with the front and 
back of the check by which payment had been made. [Pi's Ex. 25; R. 334 at p. 122] The 
payment in the amount of $7,293.00 was paid to AHS on May 15, 2001. Graham picked 
up the check at Hamlet's office on that date and cashed it at his bank on June 1, 2001. 
[Pi's Ex. 25; R. 3344 at pp. 124-125; R. 3350 at p. 1975] 
13. When Burton Lumber's President, Dan Burton, first discussed the Hamlet 
check with Graham, he stated he did not know what happened with the check and was 
researching the check. [R. 3344 at p. 123] Graham then told Klay Clawson, a Burton 
Lumber employee, that Graham may have left the check in his pocket and his wife had 
mistakenly cashed the check. In her deposition, Graham's wife denied that she had ever 
found any checks in Graham's clothes and cashed them. [R. 3344 at pp. 214-215] 
14. After investigation, Burton Lumber determined that Graham himself had 
endorsed the Hamlet check and cashed it at Wells Fargo Bank on University Avenue in 
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Provo. He had then taken $2,000.00 of the cash and immediately deposited it into his 
wife's account. The balance was deposited into Graham's account. [R. 3344 at p. 125] 
Graham was ultimately forced to admit that he cashed the check and deposited the 
proceeds in his account and his wife's account. [R. 3350 at p. 1985] 
15. Graham has contended for the first time after this case was filed that the 
work on Lots 20 and 22 was done before Burton Lumber took over the wall panel plant 
and that he was entitled to keep the check. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-144 & 214-218; R. 3347 
at p. 1390] However, the $7,293.00 Hamlet check for wall panels supplied for Kelvin 
Grove lots 20 and 22 clearly belonged to Burton Lumber as demonstrated by the time line 
contained in Plaintiffs Ex. 72: 
(a) Burton Lumber took over the operation of the wall panel plant on March 
19, 2001. [See, e ^ , Pi's Exs. 7, 8, 9 & 10] [R. 3344 at pp. 112-121] At that time, all 
AHS business was to immediately cease and all business was to be conducted by Burton 
Lumber. [Pi's Ex. 5, ^ [1.9] All business done commencing March 19, 2001 was Burton 
Lumber business done for its benefit. [R. 3344 at p. 116] 
(b) Hamlet's records show that lot 20 was not even sold until March 26, 2001 
and the house selections that the Hamlet buyer would have had to make before any wall 
panels could be ordered or produced were not made until either March 28 or March 29, 
2001. [Pi's Ex. 17] [R. 3343 at pp. 244-246] 
(c) Hamlet's records show that lot 22 was not sold by Hamlet until March 17, 
2001 and the house selections the buyer would have had to make before wall panels could 
be ordered or produced were not made until March 27, 2001. [Pi's Ex. 18] [R. 3343 at 
pp. 246-247] 
(d) Hamlet's Purchase Orders sent to AHS for wall panels for lots 20 and 22 
were dated April 16, 2001, long after Burton Lumber acquired AHS. [Pi's Exs. 12 & 13] 
[Pi's Exs 17 & 18; R. 3343 at pp. 244 & 245-254] 
(e) Hamlet purchased the lumber for the wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 from 
Anderson Lumber which did not even deliver the lumber and materials that the wall panel 
plant used for the wall panels until April 27, 2001. [Pi's Exs. 19 & 20] 
(f) The wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 were not erected on site until May 3, 
2001. [Pi's Ex. 16] [R. 3343 at pp. 340-343] 
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(g) Burton Lumber maintained a log of work orders for wall panels in the wall 
panel plant under Graham's supervision and control. Those work orders reflected that 
lots 20 and 22 were Burton Lumber jobs. Graham reviewed these work orders on an 
ongoing basis and never took the position that lots 20 and 22 were AHS jobs even though 
he did have the log revised to delete two jobs that were not Burton Lumber jobs. [Pi's 
Exs. 21 & 22] [R. 3345 at pp. 543-549] 
(h) Klay Clawson ("Clawson") prepared Burton Lumber's invoices to Hamlet 
for lots 20 and 22. [Pi's Ex. 19, Bates No. B04389; Pi's Ex. 29, Bates No. B04401] He 
received the information to prepare the invoices from Graham who did not tell Clawson 
that on May 1, 2001 Graham had signed the Hamlet Purchase Orders and submitted them 
to Hamlet to obtain payment for lots 20 and 22 or that Graham was paid $7,293.00 for 
these jobs on May 15, 2001, and embezzled the money. [R. 3344 at pp. 211-214] 
16. The court finds Graham's testimony with respect to the Hamlet check (and 
in other areas) to be unreliable and lacking in veracity and credibility. Instead of telling 
Dan Burton and others at Burton Lumber that he cashed the check when he clearly knew 
he had done so and knew the check belonged to Burton Lumber, Graham made up false 
excuses and sent Burton Lumber on a wild goose chase to track down the check. [R. 
3344 at pp. 123 & 214-215; R. 3347 at p. 1390] Graham's testimony that he worked on 
wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 before receiving any purchase orders is implausible and 
inconsistent with the other evidence and is rejected by the court. [See, Findings 15 & 18] 
Graham's excuse that he did not remember cashing the check is disingenuous. 
Graham's Termination 
17. After learning of Graham's dishonesty, Dan Burton decided to terminate 
him but did not want to do so immediately to avoid any adverse effect on a customer's job 
in progress in Nauvoo, Illinois. [R. 3344 at pp. 138-139 & 141] 
18. On August 28, 2001, Dan Burton and Jeff Burton, President and Vice 
President of Burton Lumber, respectively, met with Graham at Burton Lumber's offices 
in Salt Lake City. At that meeting, after first contending that he thought the money 
belonged to him for a job done on Lot 703, Graham admitted cashing the Hamlet check, 
3
 Graham admitted in his deposition that when he picked up the $7,293 Hamlet 
check he knew it related to Lots 20 and 22. [R. 3350 at p. 1976] 
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that the money belonged to Burton Lumber and that he owed Burton Lumber $7,293.00 
for that check. Graham stated that he would repay Burton Lumber that amount on August 
31, 2001, three days after the meeting. Graham also agreed to turn in the next day the 
company truck he was using. Burton Lumber terminated Graham at the meeting effective 
immediately. [See Pi's Ex. 39] [R. 3344 at pp. 141-144; Pi's Exs. 38 & 39] Burton 
Lumber acted in good faith in terminating Graham based on its good faith and reasonable 
belief- - consistent with the court's finding - - that Graham had embezzled the Hamlet 
check. [R. 3344 at pp. 138-139 & 141; Pi's Ex. 43, 44 & 45; R. 3348 at pp. 1656-1651] 
Graham's explanations to Burton Lumber concerning the check were inadequate and 
incredulous. Following termination, Graham fabricated the story that the check rightfully 
belonged to him for his work on Lots 20 and 22. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-144 & 127-137; 
Pi's Exs. 72, 19 & 20] Burton Lumber did not terminate Graham to avoid paying him a 
share of the wall panel plant profits (of which there were none). [R. 3344 at pp. 138-141] 
Although Graham was an employee-at-will and could be terminated at any time without 
cause [Pi's Ex. 5,% 7.1 and Ex. B; R. 3344 at pp. 104-105; R. 3350 at p. 1962], Burton 
Lumber had just cause for terminating him for dishonesty. [See, Findings 11-16 & 18] 
Burton Lumber's decision to terminate Graham was not based on any advice or 
recommendation from International Profit Associates. [R. 3344 at pp. 138-141] Graham 
did not repay the $7,293.00 or turn in the company truck as promised. [R. 3344 at pp. 
151-152] Burton Lumber was later able to repossess that truck. [Id.] 
19. Under the Agreement, Graham was entitled to keep the truck Burton 
Lumber leased for him and to receive title to the truck if he was terminated "without just 
cause." [Pi's Ex. 5, \7.2] Because Burton Lumber terminated Graham with just cause 
[See, Findings 11-18], Graham had no right to the truck after he was terminated. 
20. Under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5], if Burton Lumber 
terminated Graham with or without cause his right to receive any further share of the 
panel plant profits immediately terminated. A provision more favorable to Graham had 
been included in the earlier drafts of the Agreement, but was changed when the non-
competition provision was deleted. [Pi's Exs. 1 &2,\ 7.4; R. 3344 at pp. 104-105] 
Graham unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a $100,000 payment from Burton Lumber 
if he were terminated for cause. [Pi's Ex. 4, Bates No. G00046, ^ 7.4] 
21. Graham was not concerned with the termination provision contained in 
paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement because if he were terminated he intended to immediately 
go into business for himself next door and "run them [Burton Lumber] out of business." 
[R. 3344 at pp. 104-106] 
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22. On September 5, 2001, shortly after Graham was terminated, Burton 
Lumber's General Counsel, Robert Burton sent Graham a letter stating that Burton 
Lumber proposed to apply Graham's final salary check in the amount of $1,451.43 
toward the $7,293.00 owed by Graham to Burton Lumber on the Hamlet check and that if 
Graham disagreed with Burton Lumber doing so to notify Mr. Burton. [Pi's Ex. 40] 
Graham did not object and thereby acquiesced in Burton Lumber crediting his salary 
check to his debt. [7?. 3344 at p. 151] Graham is entitled to a credit for the amount of the 
final salary check against the $7,193.00 owed on the Hamlet check. Thus, the net 
principal amount owed by Graham on the Hamlet check is $5,841.57. 
23. Graham was not entitled to a third quarter 2001 bonus. That bonus would 
have only accrued at the September 30 end of the third quarter and was not payable until 
October. [Pi's Ex. 5, \12] Graham had already been terminated before that date. [R. 
3344 at pp. 141-144] Under paragraph 7.2 of the Agreement, Graham had to still be 
employed by Burton Lumber at the time a bonus was due to receive a bonus. Further, 
under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5], if Burton Lumber terminated Graham 
with or without cause, his right to receive any bonus terminated. 
24. Even if Graham had not been terminated, Burton Lumber's wall panel plant 
did not earn any profits in which Graham could have shared. Burton Lumber's wall panel 
plant lost $50,645.86 in 2001, $49,390.90 in 2002 and $227,570.87 in 2003. [Pi's Exs. 
43, 44 & 45] [R. 3348 at pp. 1656-1657] 
The Phony Jason Current Invoice for $2,148.00 
25. After Graham was terminated, Burton Lumber learned of another dishonest 
act that Graham had committed. Unbeknownst to Graham's superiors at Burton Lumber, 
Graham had purchased a generator to personally rent to contractors on Burton Lumber 
jobs where there was no temporary power. Graham caused Burton Lumber to include a 
rental charge for the generator in its bid on the "Bowen job" and collect for the generator. 
Graham then approached Jason Current ("Current"), a subcontractor who installed wall 
panels for Burton Lumber, and had him phony up on a rush basis an invoice to Burton 
Lumber for $2,148.00 for work on the Bowen job that Current admitted he was not 
involved in and for work that Current did not in fact perform. [Pi's Exs. 26 & 42] 
Graham caused Burton Lumber to issue a check to Current for $2,148.00 the next 
business day. [Pi's Exs. 27 & 42] Graham gave the check to Current and instructed 
Current to simultaneously give Graham a check for the $2,148.00, which Current did. 
[Pi's Exs. 28 & 42] [R. 3344 at pp. 153-156; R. 3343 at pp. 365-375; Pi's Ex. 42A] 
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Although Graham has attempted to contend that he and Current were partners, Current 
was not a partner of Graham's in renting generators and never agreed to any such 
relationship. Graham received the entire $2,148.00, did not pay Current any portion of 
the profit and did not use the money to purchase any other generator in which Current 
would have an interest. [Id.] Graham did not request or receive permission from Burton 
Lumber to rent generators on Burton Lumber jobs and Graham's superiors at Burton 
Lumber had no knowledge he was doing so. [R. 3344 at pp. 153-156; R. 3343 at p. 447] 
By this subterfuge, Graham received a secret profit of $2,148.00 on a Burton Lumber job 
and usurped a corporate opportunity of Burton Lumber. [Id.; R. 3343 at pp. 365-378; 
Pi's Exs. 27, 28,42 &42A] 
•k k k 
Graham's Conversion of Burton Lumber's Personal Property 
27. Under the Agreement, Burton Lumber acquired all of the assets of the wall 
panel business except accounts receivable and personal assets of Graham such as his 
"home, furniture, cars, and clothing." Graham was supposed to make a list of all of the 
assets. [Pi's Ex. 5, Tfl[l.l and 1.6] Rather than making a list of all of the assets, Graham 
listed what he informed Burton Lumber were the main assets of the business for which he 
was paid by Burton Lumber and informed Steve Hawkes that all other business assets 
were included. [See Asset Schedule attached as an exhibit to Plaintiffs Ex. 5] [R. 3343 
at pp. 435-436; R. 3344 at pp. 100-104; R. 3347 at pp. 1417-1419] Graham set the total 
value of these assets at $54,175 and Burton Lumber agreed to and did pay that value as 
fair value of all of the fixed assets. [R. 3344 at pp. 103-104; R. 3347 at pp. 1420-1421] 
The court finds the testimony of Dan Burton and Steven Hawkes in this regard 
persuasive. 
28. After Graham was terminated, he took possession of and converted the 
following items belonging to Burton Lumber outlined in Burton Lumber's Ex. 63: 
k k k 
These items belonged to Burton Lumber under the Agreement. [See PI's Ex. 5; Finding 
27] Consequently, Graham unlawfully converted these items and Burton Lumber is 
entitled to recover their value in the amount of $7,517.59. [R. 3345 at pp. 565-579; Pi's 
Ex. 63A] 
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Burton Lumber's Alleged Conversion of Graham's Personal Property. 
29. Burton Lumber did not convert any personal property owned by Graham. 
Burton Lumber owned all of the personal property that Graham left at the wall panel plant 
premises when he was terminated, including the personal property listed in Plaintiffs Ex. 
29 that Graham contends was converted. [See, Findings 27 & 28] In this regard, Dan 
Burton and Steve Hawkes conceded that Graham's Gooseneck trailer and van were not 
part of the sale and Graham was entitled to those items. [R. 3344 at pp. 101-102; R. 3343 
at p. 437] 
The Notice to Vacate 
30. Under the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to assume all of 
Graham's ongoing obligations under his lease with the landlord for the panel plant. [PI fs 
Ex. 5, f 3.3] Although Burton Lumber decided not to have the lease assigned to it, 
Burton Lumber did in fact assume and pay Graham's ongoing obligations under the lease, 
including the monthly lease payments. [R. 3344 at pp. 111-112; R. 3347 at pp. 1472-
1474] 
31. On September 7, 2001 (ten days after he was terminated), Graham served a 
Notice to Vacate on Burton Lumber, giving Burton Lumber notice of his demand that 
Burton Lumber vacate the panel plant premises no later than October 1, 2001. 
32. The Notice to Vacate was invalid because Burton Lumber had assumed all 
of Graham's obligations under the lease with the landlord, including the obligation to pay 
rent until expiration of the lease and had the corresponding right to occupy the premises 
until expiration of the Lease. [See, Finding 30] Thus, Burton Lumber was not a month-
to-month tenant. Nevertheless, Burton Lumber wanted a bigger plant with a better 
location anyway and, after receiving the Notice to Vacate, decided to vacate the panel 
plant as soon as it could locate alternative space to operate the business. [R. 3344 at pp. 
152-153] 
33. Klay Clawson, who was then the manager of the wall panel plant, told 
Graham that Burton Lumber would not be able to vacate for a few weeks after October 1. 
Graham told Clawson that was okay and thereby agreed that Burton Lumber could have a 
few weeks after October 1 to vacate the premises. [R. 3344 at pp. 223-224] 
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34. Burton Lumber subsequently found alternative space and vacated the panel 
plant on October 25, 2001. [R. 3344 at pp. 152-153] 
35. Burton Lumber paid the landlord the monthly lease payment on the panel 
plant for October 2001 in the amount of $1,705.29. [Pi's Ex. 46] Graham never tendered 
this payment back to Burton Lumber. [R. 3350 at p. 1947] 
36. Graham failed to prove that he suffered any damages or the amount of 
damages suffered by virtue of Burton Lumber remaining in the premises until October 25, 
2001. 
37. Burton Lumber did not do any damage to the panel plant. Any damage to 
the panel plant had been done by AHS before Burton Lumber acquired the panel plant. 
[R. 3345 at pp. 562-563; R. 3346 at pp. 801-802] Moreover, at the time Graham claims 
damage was done to the panel plant, he was the General Manager of the plant and 
responsible for its care and maintenance. He had the duty as General Manager to ensure 
that the plant premises were properly maintained. [R. 3350 at p. 1991] There was no 
evidence that Graham reported any damage to his superiors at Burton Lumber or caused 
his employees to repair damages he now claims they did under his supervision. 
The Six Other Hamlet Jobs Graham Claims Were for the Account of AHS 
38. Graham contended for the first time long after this lawsuit was filed that 
Burton Lumber owed him money on six Hamlet jobs in addition to Lots 20 and 22 that 
Graham claims were AHS jobs. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-146; R. 3345 at pp. 548-549; R. 
3347 at p. 1391] These jobs are the following: Muirfield Lot 443, Glen Eagles Lots 109 
and 114, and Shetland Meadows Lots 36, 70 and 82. Graham himself received all but one 
of the Hamlet checks on these jobs and endorsed and/or delivered the checks to Burton 
Lumber. [R. 3350 at pp. 1971-1974] Graham never contended that these jobs were AHS 
jobs until months after he was terminated. [R. 3344 at pp. 141-146; R. 3345 at pp. 548-
549; R. 3347 at pp. 1390-1391] The court concludes that each of these jobs was in fact a 
Burton Lumber job and that Graham is not entitled to recover any sums relating to these 
jobs. [Pi's Exs. 21, 22, 73, 55-60 & 64-70] 
39. Each of the six jobs was included as a Burton Lumber job on the Burton 
Lumber work order log that was maintained under Graham's supervision and direction 
and that he reviewed on an ongoing basis. [Pi's Ex. 21; R. 3345 at pp. 543-549] Graham 
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never deleted these jobs even though he changed the log to delete two other jobs that did 
not belong to Burton Lumber. [Id.] 
40. Plaintiffs Ex. 73, which is a time line summarizing the relevant dates with 
respect to these jobs, plainly demonstrates that these lots were Burton Lumber jobs . . . . 
[See, e.g., Finding 15(a); Pi's Exs. 5, 7-77, 55-56 & 58-59; R. 3350 at pp. 1966 & 1948, 
1971 & 1973-1974; R. 3343 at pp. 248-249 & 348; R. 3344 at pp. 222-223] 
Punitive Damages 
41. The court finds that in embezzling the Hamlet check, obtaining the secret 
profit from the rental of his generator and converting Burton Lumber's personal property, 
Graham acted fraudulently, willfully, maliciously and with the intent to damage Burton 
Lumber or in reckless disregard of Burton Lumber's rights. [Findings 7-9, 11-16, 18,25 
& 27-28] Therefore, punitive damages should be awarded against Graham in an amount 
to be determined by the court at a future hearing. [7?. 3329-3327] 
[The Following Punitive Damages Findings Were Entered After Hearing on the 
Amount of Punitive Damages] [See, Addendum B] 
13. Graham's current annual income is approximately $40,000. Graham's tax 
returns introduced into evidence at the attorneys' fee hearing reflect that his annual 
income was $60,654 in 2001; $33,065 in 2002; $61,943 in 2003 and $57,548 in 2004. 
His net worth is approximately $12,000 according to Graham's testimony. [7?. 3354 at pp. 
157-158; PVs Ex. 1 at evidentiary hearing] 
14. The nature of Graham's dishonest conduct and the facts and circumstances 
surrounding that conduct as described more fully in the court's previous Findings of Fact 
entered in this action are reprehensible especially given the fiduciary duties that Graham 
owed to Burton Lumber as the General Manager of its wall panel plant. Graham stole 
from Burton Lumber and then lied about his theft and made up preposterous lies and 
excuses to attempt to conceal his dishonesty. Graham then forced Burton Lumber to 
incur very substantial attorneys' fees to defend Graham's frivolous counterclaims, which 
Graham asserted in bad faith, and in order to recover the monies owed by Graham to 
Burton Lumber for theft of the Hamlet Homes check, the phony Jason Current invoice 
paid by Burton Lumber and Burton Lumber's personal property stolen by Graham. [See, 
Findings 7-18, 25 & 27, supra] 
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15. Not only was Burton Lumber forced to incur very substantial attorneys' 
fees, but Graham's dishonesty and wrongful prosecution and defense of this lawsuit 
forced Burton Lumber management and employees to spend hundreds of hours to defend 
against Graham's counterclaims and support the claims asserted by Burton Lumber 
against Graham. This time included preparing for and appearing at numerous lengthy 
depositions taken by Graham, assembling, analyzing and producing many thousands of 
pages of Burton Lumber documents and preparing for and testifying at trial. [R. 3354 at 
pp. 165-166] 
16. The court finds there is a probability that Graham may engage in dishonest 
business conduct in the future. Graham testified falsely at trial concerning his actions. 
[See, Findings 11-18, supra] Graham has never apologized to Burton Lumber for his 
actions. [R. 3354 at p. 164] 
17. The actual principal amount of the damages awarded to Burton Lumber 
with respect to Graham's dishonest conduct was $16,958.00. 
18. It is reasonable to award punitive damages against Graham in the amount of 
$34,000.00, or approximately two times the actual damages awarded against Graham. 
Attorney's Fees 
42. Paragraph 9 of the Agreement contains the following attorney's fee 
provision: 
Indemnity. All of the representations, warranties, and covenants in this 
Agreement and the obligations of the parties with respect thereto shall 
survive the Closing. Seller agrees that he will indemnify, defend, protect 
and hold harmless Buyer and its employees from and against all liabilities, 
claims, damages, actions, demands, assessments, adjustments, penalties, 
losses, costs and expenses whatsoever (including court costs and attorneys' 
fees) that arise as a result of or incident to the following: Occurrences 
before the Closing Date; any breach of, misrepresentation in, untruth in or 
inaccuracy in the representations and warranties by Seller; non-fulfillment 
or non-performance of any agreement, covenant or condition on the part of 
Seller made in this Agreement or an [sic] any other document delivered 
pursuant to this Agreement. [PI's Ex. 5] 
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43. With the exception of Graham's defense to Burton Lumber's 
misrepresentation of profits and reimbursement of personal expense claims, Graham's 
claims and defenses in this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith. [See, 
Findings and Conclusions generally] [R. 3333-3329] 
[The Following Findings Were Entered After Hearing on the Amount of Attorney's 
Fees] 
1. Burton Lumber incurred attorneys' fees in prosecuting its claims and 
defending the counterclaims asserted by Graham in this action in the amount of 
$164,933.75. [R. 3066-3065, f 2] Burton Lumber incurred additional attorneys' fees of 
$6,027.50 with respect to the hearing on the amount of attorneys' fees and punitive 
damages and preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental 
Judgement with respect thereto. [R. 3286] Thus, the total attorneys' fees incurred by 
Burton Lumber in this action is the amount of $170,961.25. This amount is exclusive of 
attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber with respect to its fraud claim against Graham 
which was dismissed by the court. 
2. In support of its claim for attorneys' fees, Burton Lumber presented the 
affidavit [R. 3066, 3100 & 3286] and testimony of its lead counsel, Richard D. Burbidge 
[R. 3354 at pp. 24-147], and all of its billing records. [R. 3060, et seq.] Burbidge & 
Mitchell's time records are kept by attorneys at Burbidge & Mitchell by hand and then 
those time records on cases are typed up as the billing statement. There is no additional 
detail in the time records kept by individual attorneys other than what is included in the 
bills. [R. 3354 at pp. 46-48] 
3. When this case was originally filed, Robert Burton represented Burton 
Lumber and expended a substantial number of hours representing Burton Lumber in this 
case with respect to which Burton Lumber is not claiming any reimbursement. [R. 3354 
at p. 23; R. 3366-3062] 
4. The normal hourly rate charged by Richard D. Burbidge for legal services is 
$350.00 per hour. The normal hourly rate of Stephen B. Mitchell charged for his legal 
services is $310.00 an hour. [R. 3065, ^ 2] Messrs. Burbidge and Mitchell performed the 
vast bulk of the legal services performed for Burton Lumber in this action. Nevertheless, 
Burton Lumber was billed and paid for their legal services at the substantially reduced 
rate of $200.00 per hour based upon the relationship between Burbidge & Mitchell and 
Burton Lumber. [R. 3065, ^ 2] Graham obtained the benefit of this substantially reduced 
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billing rate. The time of associates and paralegals at Burbidge & Mitchell was billed at 
their normal rates ranging from $40.00 to $165.00. [See, Billing Statements R. 3060, et 
seq.; R. 3354 at pp. 59-60] 
5. The legal services performed by Burbidge & Mitchell on behalf of Burton 
Lumber and the legal fees incurred with respect thereto were necessary, reasonable and 
appropriate. Both the hourly rates and the amount of attorneys' fees charged by Burbidge 
& Mitchell to Burton Lumber in this action were reasonable and customary according to 
the custom and practice in both Salt Lake County and Utah County considering the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of Burton Lumber's counsel in presenting the 
case, the expertise and experience of the attorneys representing Burton Lumber and the 
result obtained, including successfully defending the counterclaims asserted by Graham 
against Burton Lumber of approximately $1.5 Million. [R. 3063-3062; R. 3354 at p. 26] 
In this regard, the amount of attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber was substantially 
increased as a result of Graham's litigation strategy, including the taking of numerous 
lengthy depositions, requesting and receiving many thousands of pages of documents, and 
lengthy questioning of witnesses and calling at best tangentially relevant witnesses at trial 
which significantly lengthened the trial. [R. 3064-3063, %% 4-5 & n.l] 
6. Burton Lumber has allocated to the fraud claim and has deducted from the 
amount of attorneys' fees for which reimbursement is sought more than the amount of 
time actually expended in pursuing the fraud claim which was dismissed by the court. [R. 
3065, f 5] Moreover, almost all, if not all, of the legal services performed with respect to 
the fraud claim were also relevant and necessary with respect to other issues in the case 
upon which Burton Lumber was successful. For example, the fact established by Burton 
Lumber that Graham's business had no value other than the value of its hard assets was 
relevant to Graham's unconscionability, fraud and breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing claims, among others. As a further example, the fact established by 
Burton Lumber that Graham misrepresented that he had earned net profits of $250,000 
per year in his business when in fact he had not earned any profits in excess of a small 
salary for himself was also relevant to these claims, as well as being relevant to Graham's 
credibility, including the credibility of his explanations for taking the Hamlet Homes 
check that belonged to Burton Lumber and his purported justification for the phony Jason 
Current invoice of $2,148. [R. 3065-3064, ^ 3] 
7. Burton Lumber did not allocate any time to the prosecution of its improper 
expense reimbursement claim that the court dismissed. The amount of time involved was 
minimal. [R. 3354 at pp. 80-81] Further, almost all, if not all, of the legal services 
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devoted to this issue were necessary and relevant with respect to Graham's credibility in 
this case, including his credibility with respect to the matters set forth in Finding No. 6. 
8. Burton Lumber did not allocate any fees to the issues on which it was 
unsuccessful on summary judgment, but on which Burton Lumber prevailed at trial and 
the court has concluded such an allocation is not legally required. In any event, almost 
all, if not all, of the legal services provided with respect to such issues would have been 
necessary in preparing for and conducting the trial. In other words, such legal services 
were not duplicated at trial and were utilized by Burton Lumber at trial. [R. 3354 at pp. 
89-93] 
9. The court has found that Graham's defense of Burton Lumber's claims on 
which it was successful and his prosecution of his counterclaims was in bad faith and that 
such defenses and claims were without merit. Burton Lumber would not have incurred 
any attorneys' fees or costs for a summary judgment motion on the claims on which 
Burton Lumber ultimately prevailed if Graham had not defended and prosecuted such 
frivolous claims and defenses in bad faith. [See, Findings and Conclusions generally] 
10. Although the court does not believe that any further reduction of fees is 
required, the court finds based upon the evidence presented and the court's review of 
Burbidge & Mitchell's billings [R. 3060-2988], the pleadings, including the summary 
judgment memoranda and trial briefs [R. 1359, 2352, 2689 & 2810] , that a further 
reduction of $5,000 will more than compensate for any fees incurred by Burton Lumber 
with respect to the improper expense reimbursement claim, the motion for summary 
judgment with respect to claims that were not dismissed at the summary judgment stage 
and the claims originally alleged by Burton Lumber, but not alleged in the Amended 
Complaint. 
12. Thus, the net amount of reasonable attorney's fees that Burton Lumber is 
entitled to recover is $164,461.25. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Graham has failed to demonstrate that the trial court findings which he attacks are 
clearly erroneous. Instead, Graham has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
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findings and then demonstrate that the findings are not supported by the clear weight of 
the evidence. Graham has also failed to adequately brief the issues. Consequently, the 
court should refuse to consider the issues raised by Graham in his brief. 
The trial court correctly found that Burton Lumber was entitled to recover on its 
complaint. The evidence demonstrated that Graham stole a $7,293 Hamlet Homes check 
belonging to Burton Lumber and then lied to Burton Lumber about the check and made 
up preposterous excuses to hide his theft; that Graham improperly obtained a $2,148 
secret profit and usurped a Burton Lumber corporate opportunity by having a 
subcontractor submit a phony invoice to Burton Lumber and, after receiving payment for 
that invoice, secretly write a check out to Graham for the amount of the invoice; and that 
Graham converted Burton Lumber's property having a value of $7,517.59. The trial court 
properly awarded $34,000 in punitive damages based upon its finding that Graham's 
conduct was fraudulent, willful and malicious. The amount of punitive damages was well 
within the trial court's discretion and is amply supported by the trial court's findings and 
supporting evidence. The trial court also properly awarded Burton Lumber its attorney's 
fees pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Agreement between the parties and pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Graham never raised his argument that paragraph 9 only applies 
to third party indemnity claims until this appeal and is barred from doing so. In any 
event, paragraph 9 is not limited to third party indemnity situations. Graham makes no 
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effort to demonstrate that the award of attorney's fees under 78-27-56 is clearly 
erroneous. In fact, that award is clearly supported by the findings and supporting 
evidence. 
Graham has likewise failed to demonstrate that the trial court's findings dismissing 
his counterclaim are clearly erroneous. Paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement was not 
unconscionable and Graham's contention that it was unconscionable because it allowed 
Burton Lumber to terminate him without cause and avoid paying him any further amounts 
for the purchase of his business was rendered moot by the trial court's decision that 
Graham was terminated for cause. In any event, there was no procedural or substantive 
unconscionability and summary judgment on unconscionability was properly entered. 
Burton Lumber terminated Graham for cause because of his dishonesty and therefore did 
not breach any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In any event, Graham 
was an employee at-will who could be terminated without cause at any time and he 
understood and agreed to that provision. In addition, because Burton Lumber did not earn 
any profits at the wall panel plant during 2001 through 2003, Graham would not have 
been entitled to any share of profits even had he not been terminated. 
Graham's Notice to Vacate was invalid because Burton Lumber was not a month-
to-month tenant as it had assumed all of Graham's obligations under the lease and was 
thus entitled to occupy the premises. Moreover, Graham agreed that Burton Lumber 
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could vacate the premises within a few weeks after October 1 and Burton Lumber did so. 
Indeed, Burton Lumber paid the monthly lease payment for October 2001 and Graham 
never tendered the payment back to Burton Lumber. Moreover, the evidence showed that 
the claimed damage to the premises occurred before Burton Lumber took over. 
The trial court properly determined that Graham was not entitled to recover on the 
six Hamlet jobs that he argued for the first time long after he was terminated belonged to 
him. Those jobs in fact were Burton Lumber jobs. Graham improperly refers to Judge 
Claudia Laycock5s January 12,2004 memorandum ruling granting Burton Lumber 
summary judgment on Graham's unconscionability and fraud counterclaims. That ruling 
was superceded by the Partial Summary Judgment which did not include the incorrect 
undisputed facts that Judge Laycock had inadvertently included in her ruling and the trial 
court correctly permitted evidence at trial on these issues. 
Burton Lumber did not convert any equipment belonging to Graham. Burton 
Lumber purchased all of Graham's personal property used in his business. 
Graham's final salary check was credited against the amount owed to Burton 
Lumber without objection by Graham. Graham was not owed any amount for his third 
quarter bonus because he was terminated before the end of the third quarter and before 
the bonus was payable. Graham was also not entitled to retain the leased truck because he 
was terminated for cause. Graham is not entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs 
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because the trial court's rulings in favor of Burton Lumber are amply supported by the 
evidence. 
Finally, pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Agreement, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
and Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Burton Lumber should be awarded 
its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. GRAHAM HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT BURTON LUMBER IS 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ON ITS COMPLAINT ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. THE FINDINGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
1. Graham Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting the Trial 
Court's Factual Findings and to Adequately Brief the Issues. 
Both this court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly admonished that pursuant 
to Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, an appellant challenging the factual 
findings of the trial court must scower the record to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the findings. See, United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. 
Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ffif 24-27, 140 P.3d 1200; State v. Park, 2005 UT 75, \ 17, 124 P.3d 
235; Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, f 21, 54 P.3d 1177 "c[T]he 
challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the evidence and 
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then explain how those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence'" Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 78, 100 P.3d 1177. In the case at bar, Graham has failed to even 
make a pretext of marshaling the evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Instead, 
Graham's brief creates its own virtual reality unpopulated by the trial court's Findings of 
Fact or the overwhelming evidence supporting the findings. 
Because Graham has failed to marshal the evidence, this court, in its discretion, 
will assume that the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence and will refuse to 
review the findings. Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 2007 UT 42,ffi[ 17-21, 164 P.3d 384. This failure alone disposes of all of the 
issues raised by Graham on appeal. In any event, as Burton Lumber will now 
demonstrate, all of the trial court's findings challenged by Graham are amply supported 
by the evidence. 
Relatedly, Graham has also failed to adequately brief the issues by setting forth the 
trial court's findings and all evidence supporting the findings, demonstrating why the 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and discussing and analyzing the 
applicable law and relating it to the facts. Instead, Graham has done little more than to 
selectively (and often inaccurately and misleadingly) cite evidence which he believes is 
favorable to his cause and then simply conclude that the trial court erred in not adopting 
his factual contentions. Because Graham has failed to adequately brief the issues, the 
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court should refuse to consider the issues raised in Graham's brief. See, e.g., Phillips v. 
Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108, 1109-1110 (Utah App. 1995); State of Utah v. Sloan, 2003 UT 
App. 170, 72 P.3d 138, 141-142; Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 198-199 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
2. The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Is Entitled to Recover 
the Net Amount Owing by Graham with Respect to the $7,293 Hamlet 
Homes Check for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22 is Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Graham erroneously asserts that he did not convert the $7,293 Hamlet Check 
because the wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 Kelvin Grove Subdivision were produced by 
AHS before Burton Lumber took over the wall panel plant. [Aplt's Br. at pp. 21-22] To 
make this argument, Graham is forced to ignore the trial court's contrary findings, and the 
overwhelming evidence supporting those findings. The evidence presented at trial 
persuasively demonstrated that the Hamlet Homes check for $7,293.00 with respect to 
these two lots belonged to Burton Lumber, but was converted by Graham, that Graham 
then lied to Burton Lumber about the check and made up preposterous excuses to hide his 
theft. [See, Findings 11-18; Pi's Ex. 72]4 For example, Hamlet only awarded jobs to its 
various subcontractors by written Purchase Orders. [R. 3343 at pp. 29, 304-305 & 335] 
Hamlet did not even deliver its Purchase Orders for Lots 20 and 22 until April 16, almost 
4
 The references to "Findings" herein refer to the findings contained in the 
Statement of Facts above, which include the supporting record citations. 
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a month after Burton Lumber took over on March 19. The lumber for these jobs was not 
even delivered to the wall panel plant until April 27. [Finding 15(e)]5 
Contrary to Graham's later contrived story, at the August 28, 2001 termination 
meeting with Burton Lumber, and after sending Burton Lumber employees on wild goose 
chases based on his lies, Graham finally admitted that he had cashed the Hamlet check 
and that the money belonged to Burton Lumber. Graham agreed that he would repay 
Burton Lumber within three days, but failed to do so. [Finding 18] 
Not only is Graham's claim with respect to the $7,293.00 check belied by the 
compelling documentary evidence set forth above [Finding 15], but Burton Lumber's 
witnesses testified that there were no wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 at the wall panel 
plant when Burton Lumber took over.6 [R. 3343 at pp. 441-442; R. 3345 at pp. 542-543] 
5
 Graham was forced to belatedly concede at trial that the wall panels for Lots 20 
and 22 were not delivered and erected until May 3, 2001 and that Burton Lumber paid 
both the framing labor in the amount of $5,391.50 and for the crane services provided by 
Out of The Woods Crane Enterprises in the amount of $140.00. Thus, by Graham's own 
concession he, at the very least, embezzled the amounts Burton Lumber was owed for the 
framing labor and crane services in the sum of $5,531.50. In other words, Graham clearly 
stole. He could only quibble about how much he stole. 
6
 Graham misstates the testimony of his witness, Dave Kerlin, that Dreswick style 
wall panels for the Kelvin Grove subdivision lots 20 and 22 were manufactured under his 
supervision while Graham was vacationing with his family in Disneyland in March 2001. 
Kerlin's vague testimony is not sufficient to defeat the trial court's findings. Moreover, 
Kerlin did not testify that the wall panels were for the Kelvin Grove Subdivision. Kerlin 
specifically testified that wall panels were not produced ahead of schedule [R. 3349 at p. 
1080], and further admitted on cross-examination that he did not know how many 
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3. The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Is Entitled to Recover 
the $2,148.00 Secret Profit Graham Received By Submitting the Phony 
Jason Current Invoice is Not Clearly Erroneous. 
The evidence at trial clearly established, and the trial court correctly found, that at 
Graham's behest Jason Current submitted a phony $2,148.00 invoice on August 17, 2001 
for a generator that he did not in fact provide to a Burton Lumber job. [Finding 25] 
Graham then caused Burton Lumber to immediately pay Current the $2,148.00 the next 
business day and (to avoid leaving a paper trail) had Current write a check to Graham for 
that same amount. [Id.] Graham thereby usurped a Burton Lumber corporate opportunity 
and received a secret profit at Burton Lumber's expense. [Id.] 
As general manager of Burton Lumber's panel plant, Graham owed Burton 
Lumber a fiduciary duty, as the trial court correctly found. See, Envirotech Corp. v. 
Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 497 (Utah App. 1994) cert den. Graham was not entitled to 
make any personal profit on Burton Lumber's jobs without full and complete disclosure 
to Burton Lumber. See, e.g., United States v. Drumrn, 329 F.2d 109, 112-113 (1st Cir. 
1964); Green v. H&R Block, Inc., 735 A.2d 1039, 1056-1057 (Md. App. 1999); 
Wormhoudt Lumber Co. ofOttumwa, 219 N.W.2d 543, 545-547 (Iowa 1974). Burton 
Dreswick homes were built in any given month, did not know which lots they were built 
for, and did not keep records of the panels on which homes were sitting in the yard on any 
given day. Moreover, and most importantly, Kerlin admitted on cross-examination that 
Graham's counsel had given him the supposed dates and that his testimony was simply 
speculation. [R. 3349 at pp. 1103-1106] 
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Lumber was not even required to prove out-of-pocket loss as a result of Graham's 
unlawful conduct. See, Tri-Star Technologies Co. v. Lautieri, 257 B.R. 629, 636 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2001); Wormhoudt Lumber, 219 N.W.2d at 545-547; Green, 735 A.2d at 1056-
1057. 
In addition, the trial court correctly found that the opportunity to rent generators on 
Burton Lumber jobs was a corporate opportunity of Burton Lumber's that Graham 
usurped for his own benefit. [Finding 25] As General Manager of the wall panel plant, 
Graham was prohibited from usurping Burton Lumber's corporate opportunity for his 
own profit without full and fair disclosure to Burton Lumber. See, e.g., C&Y Corp. v. 
General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App. 1995); American Federal Group, 
Ltd. v. Rothenberg, 136 F.3d 897, 906 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
Graham argues that there was nothing secret about his profit because he included 
the charge in Burton Lumber's bid.7 [Aplt's Br. at pp. 22-23] Graham's supervisor 
Hawkes denied Graham's fabricated story that Hawkes had given Graham permission to 
rent generators on Burton Lumber jobs. [R. 3343 at p. 447] The trial court found that 
7
 Graham also erroneously argues that because Burton Lumber supposedly did not take 
Current up on his offer to repay the money, that somehow constituted a waiver of Burton 
Lumber's right to recover the secret profit from Graham. Waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right. Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 72 (Utah 1998). Graham 
cites no evidence - and there is none - that Burton Lumber intended to relinquish its right to 
recover the $2,148 from Graham, who ended up with the money. The trial court rejected 
Graham's factual waiver argument. 
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Graham did not request or receive permission from Burton Lumber to rent generators on 
Burton Lumber jobs and that Graham's supervisor had no knowledge he was doing so. 
[Finding 25]8 
4. The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Is Entitled to Recover 
$7,517.59 for the Property Converted by Graham is Not Clearly 
Erroneous, 
Burton Lumber proved at trial, and the trial court found, that Burton Lumber 
acquired all Graham's personal property used in the business and located in the premises 
"[ejxcept for accounts receivable and personal assets of Graham such as his home, 
furniture, cars, and clothing" and that Graham converted personal property belonging to 
Burton Lumber having a fair market value of $7,517.59. [Pi's Ex. 5 and Findings 27 & 
28] Graham's one-half page argument on this issue that Burton Lumber "failed to 
establish entitlement to the items in question" [Aplt's Br. at p. 24] fails to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings or adequately brief the issue and is without 
merit. 
8
 Not only that, but the amount charged by Graham was outrageous; it was enough 
to buy the generator rather than rent it for a few days. Susan West testified that the rental 
charge for a generator was only $30 to $25 a day and a generator would only be needed 
on a job for one to five days. [R. 3345 at p. 560] 
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5. Graham Has Failed to Demonstrate That the Trial Court's Award of 
Punitive Damages Is Clearly Erroneous. 
Graham argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the award of punitive 
damages, but fails to marshal (and, wholly ignores) the supporting evidence or to 
adequately brief the issue. Thus, the court should refuse to consider this issue. 
In any event, the trial court found that Graham "wilfully, maliciously and with the 
intent to damage Burton Lumber or in reckless disregard of Burton Lumber's rights" stole 
the $7,293 Hamlet check belonging to Burton Lumber and then made up preposterous lies 
to conceal his theft; that Graham intentionally embezzled the $2,148 by having Jason 
Current submit the phony invoice to Burton Lumber for a generator that Current had not 
in fact supplied; and that Graham had intentionally converted property belonging to 
Burton Lumber. [Findings 11-18, 25 & 27-28] The trial court further found that Graham's 
testimony at trial was false and fabricated in material respects. [Findings 16 & 18] The 
trial court therefore properly awarded punitive damages. The court's factual findings 
concerning punitive damages are fully supported by the evidence cited above. [Findings 
11-18, 25, 27-28 &41.]9 
9
 Graham is also wrong in arguing that Burton Lumber's dismissed fraud claim was the 
only basis for punitive damages. Burton Lumber recovered for conversion of the Hamlet check, 
conversion of its personal property and breach of fiduciary duty, each of which claims allowed an 
award of punitive damages. See, Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 
959 (Utah 1993); Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, U 35, 53 P.3d 997. [See, Findings and 
Conclusions, generally] 
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Graham also complains about the amount of punitive damages. However, the 
amount of punitive damages was well within the trial court's discretion. Hall v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109 (1998). The trial court properly considered the seven factors 
listed by the Supreme Court in Hall in awarding punitive damages in the amount of 
$34,000, which was only approximately two times the amount of compensatory damages 
awarded by the trial court and less than Graham's annual income. This amount was fully 
justified by the court's findings quoted above. [Punitive Damage Findings 13-16, p. 17-
18, supra] Typically, Graham simply ignores these findings and the supporting evidence. 
6. Graham Has Failed to Show That the Court's Award of Attorney's 
Fees Pursuant to Contract and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 Constituted 
Error. 
a. Attorney's Fees Under the Agreement. 
Paragraph 9 of the Agreement executed by Burton Lumber and Graham [Pi's Ex. 
5] entitled Burton Lumber to recover attorney's fees incurred as a result of a breach of the 
Agreement by Graham. Although Graham now argues that this provision only relates to 
third party indemnity claims [Aplt's Br. at pp. 39-40], Graham did not raise this argument 
below. Graham only claimed that Burton Lumber had waived the right to recover fees 
under the Agreement because Burton Lumber's counsel had mistakenly stated during 
opening statement in response to a question by the trial court that the Agreement did not 
33 
contain an attorney's fee provision.10 [R. 2903-2900] Graham is barred from seeking to 
raise a new argument on appeal to avoid attorney's fees. See, Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 
UT98, 17P.3dll22. 
Even if Graham could raise the argument at this late date, the trial court properly 
found Burton Lumber was entitled to recover fees under paragraph 9 of the Agreement, 
which, among other things, provides that Burton Lumber is entitled to recover fees and 
costs resulting from or arising out of any breach of the Agreement or any 
misrepresentations in connection therewith. The trial court found Graham breached the 
Agreement and made misrepresentations in connection therewith. [Findings 7-28] 
Nothing in paragraph 9 limits an award of attorney's fees to situations involving third 
party indemnity claims. 
b. Attorney's Fees Under § 78-27-56. 
Beyond that, the trial court properly determined that Burton Lumber was entitled 
to attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because Graham's claims and 
defenses were without merit and were asserted in bad faith. [Finding 43; R. 3324-3325, 
Conclusion 3; R. 2946-2951] Although Graham states the bald conclusion that "[t]he 
10
 Counsel's misstatement was understandable given the fact the issue of 
attorney's fees was reserved for determination after trial. Counsel also made clear during 
his opening statement that Burton Lumber sought attorney's fees under § 78-27-56. [R. 
3344 at p. 41] 
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evidence does not support the trial court's finding that [defendant's] claims and defenses 
in this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith" [Aplt's Br. at p. 39], 
Graham yet again fails to marshal the overwhelming evidence cited in the Statement of 
Facts above [see, e.g., Findings 11-18, 25, 27-28, & 41] that fully supports the trial 
court's finding or to make any attempt to demonstrate why the trial court's finding is 
supposedly clearly erroneous. 
Attorney's fees are recoverable under Section 78-27-56 "if the court determines 
that the action or the defense to the action [I] was without merit and [ii] not brought or 
asserted in good faith." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Watkiss 
& Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991); Warner v. DMG Color, 
Inc., 2000 UT 102 at f 21, 20 P.3d 868, 874. A claim is without merit even if it may have 
some basis in law if the court finds the facts to be contrary to a party's evidence. 
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315. In this regard, Graham's false testimony in the case at bar was 
itself sufficient to demonstrate his bad faith. See, Topik v. Thurver, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 
(Utah 1987); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah App. 1991).11 
11
 Graham also argues Burton Lumber was not entitled to recover costs because it 
supposedly filed its Memorandum of Costs before Judgment was entered. Aside from the fact 
that Graham has cited no support for this frivolous argument other than Rule 54(d)(2) which 
states no such thing, Graham's argument is factually wrong. Judgment was entered on 
November 7, 2005. [R. 2981] Burton Lumber's memorandum was filed November 14, 2005. [R. 
2987] Graham also states without discussion or support that Burton Lumber was only entitled to 
recover $150 in costs, but fails to marshal the ample evidence supporting the trial court's ruling 
awarding these costs [R. 3320] or to demonstrate the ruling is wrong. 
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Finally, Graham's argument that the amount of attorney's fees awarded by the trial 
court is clearly erroneous because Burton Lumber did not present sufficiently detailed 
evidence concerning the fees it incurred and did not properly allocate the fees between 
claims upon which Burton Lumber was successful and claims on which it was not 
successful one more time completely ignores the trial court's contrary findings and the 
evidence supporting those findings.12 Therefore, the court should decline to consider this 
issue. Moreover, the findings are fully supported by the evidence set forth in the 
Statement of Facts above. Burton Lumber filed two affidavits of its counsel as well as 
copies of all of its bills for attorney's fees. [Attorney's Fees Finding 2, p. 19, supra] 
Burton Lumber's counsel also testified extensively at the evidentiary hearing on 
attorney's fees. [R. 3354 at pp. 1-148] As the trial court found, Burton Lumber did in fact 
properly allocate. Moreover, almost all, if not all, of the services performed by Burbidge 
& Mitchell on the fraud and improper reimbursement claims upon which Burton Lumber 
did not prevail were also necessary with respect to the claims on which Burton Lumber 
did prevail. [Attorney's Fees Findings 6-8, pp. 20-21, supra] Burton Lumber was not 
required to allocate the fees where the services were necessary both with respect to claims 
12
 It is interesting that Graham rails about the trial court's award of $163,434 of 
attorney's fees to Burton Lumber, but at the same time tells the court that an award of 
$573,343.27 in attorney's fees to Graham would be reasonable. [Aplt's. Br. at p. 45] 
Burton Lumber incurred attorney's fees not only to recover from Graham but to defeat Graham's 
meritless counterclaims in excess of $1.5 million. 
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on which it was not entitled to recover fees and claims on which it was entitled to recover 
fees. See, Keith Jorgensen 's Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UT App. 121, Tf 27, 26 
P.3d 872, 879.13 
B. GRAHAM HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS DISMISSING HIS COUNTERCLAIM ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. THE FINDINGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
1. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Agreement Was Not 
Unconscionable. 
Graham argues in passing [Aplt's Br. at pp. 33-34] that the trial court erred in 
ruling on summary judgment that paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement is not unconscionable. 
Graham fails to adequately brief the issue or marshal the evidence and the court should 
refuse to consider the issue. 
The argument is also frivolous. Burton Lumber moved for summary judgment on 
Graham's eighth cause of action alleging that paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement which 
allowed Burton Lumber to terminate Graham without cause was unconscionable. [R. 
1071 & 1359] Graham opposed the motion, arguing only that the provision allowing 
13
 Graham also complains that the trial court did not permit discovery concerning 
attorney's fees after completion of the first phase of the trial and before the evidentiary 
hearing on attorney's fees. The discovery deadline expired long before trial. [R. 641] If 
Graham wanted discovery on attorney's fees he should have conducted it before the 
discovery cut-off. He was not entitled to conduct additional discovery between phases of 
the trial. This was a matter well within the trial court's discretion. See, Aspenwood, 
LLC v. CA.T., LLC, 2003 UT App. 28, U 15, 73 P.3d 947. 
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Burton Lumber to terminate Graham without cause and avoid paying him any further 
share of Burton Lumber's profits was unconscionable and there was a fact issue as to 
whether Graham had acted dishonestly entitling Burton Lumber to terminate him. [R. 
2170-2168] Graham's unconscionabihty argument is rendered moot by the trial court's 
finding after trial that Graham was terminated with cause based upon his dishonesty. 
Moreover, the trial court ruled as an undisputed fact that as a matter of law 
paragraph 7.4 was not unconscionable. [R. 2371-2370; R. 2390-2387]14 Graham has 
failed to even attempt to show how that ruling was wrong. It is a fundamental principal 
of contract law that parties are generally free to contract on their own terms and the courts 
will not relieve a party from the effects of a bargain that the party has made. See, e.g., 
Resource Management Co. v. Westin Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1040 
(Utah 1985). The standard for proving unconscionabihty is high. Unconscionabihty must 
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. See also, Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 
39 (Utah App. 1988). Graham failed to meet his burden of coming forward with 
sufficient evidence from which the finder of fact could find unconscionabihty by clear 
14
 It was proper for the trial court to determine on summary judgment that the 
Agreement was not unconscionable. See, Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 
402 (Utah 1998) (affirming summary judgment that at-will employment acknowledgment 
form was not unconscionable); Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 
1187, 1190-1191 (Utah App. 1993) (summary judgment granted on unconscionabihty 
claim). 
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and convincing evidence at the trial. See, Andalex v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046-1047 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
Unconscionability is analyzed in terms of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability. "Procedural unconscionability focuses on the manner in which the 
contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties." Resource Management, 
706 P.2d at 1041. Substantive unconscionability "examines the relative fairness of the 
obligations assumed. Substantive unconscionability is indicated by contract terms so one-
sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party. . . ." Resource Management, 
706 P.2d at 1041. See also, Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 375 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court found based upon undisputed evidence that the contract between 
Burton Lumber and Graham was not one-sided and did not shockingly favor Burton 
Lumber or Graham. The trial court found that the parties were of relatively equal 
bargaining strength and that Graham was able to negotiate some of the terms of the 
Agreement and that he consulted with an attorney and a CPA concerning the Agreement. 
[R. 2371; R 2390-2387] The trial court further found that Graham was paid the fair 
market value for his business and that it was not unconscionable that he would not receive 
a share of profits (there in fact were none) after he was terminated. [Id.] Moreover, the 
undisputed evidence demonstrated that during negotiations of the Agreement in which 
Graham was assisted by an attorney and a CPA, the termination provision was 
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specifically negotiated. Graham attempted to obtain a more favorable termination 
provision but was unsuccessful. Graham told Burton Lumber that he was not concerned 
about the provision allowing Burton Lumber to terminate him without cause and not to 
pay him any further share of profits because if he was terminated he would go next door 
and set up his own business and run Burton Lumber out of business. [Findings 20 & 21] 
2. The Trial Court's Finding That Burton Lumber Did Not Breach Any 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is Not Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Graham's claim that Burton Lumber breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by terminating him without cause to avoid paying him a share of (non 
existent) profits that he was entitled to under the Agreement was baseless and was 
properly rejected by the trial court. Graham yet again fails to marshal the evidence 
supporting this finding and to demonstrate the evidence is insufficient or to adequately 
brief the issue. Instead, Graham misleadingly and incorrectly focuses only on evidence 
that he believes supports his position. 
a. Graham Was Properly Terminated For Cause. 
The trial court correctly found that Graham was terminated for cause because of 
his dishonesty. These findings are fully supported by the evidence discussed above. 
[Findings 11-24] 
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Graham incorrectly argues in this regard that Burton Lumber decided to terminate 
Graham based upon a recommendation from International Profit Associates ("IPA") in 
order to avoid paying Graham further money. However, the trial court found that Burton 
Lumber's decision to terminate Graham was not based on any advice or recommendation 
from IP A. That decision had already been made. [Finding 18] Again, this finding is fully 
supported by the evidence cited above. Indeed, this supposed "smoking gun" IPA 
memorandum [Pi's Ex. 62] upon which Graham relies did not recommend that Graham be 
terminated, but only recognized that his "problems" would force him to leave Burton 
Lumber. [Findings 17 & 18] 
b. Graham Was an Employee At-Will Who Could Be Terminated 
At Any time Without Cause. 
Even if it is assumed incorrectly for argument that Burton Lumber terminated 
Graham without cause, that fiction would not assist Graham. By virtue of paragraph 7.1 
of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5] and the Acknowledgment signed by Graham, which was 
attached as Exhibit B to the Agreement, Graham specifically acknowledged that he was 
an employee "at-will" and could be terminated by Burton Lumber "at any time with or 
without cause or notice" and that nothing in Burton Lumber's manual "guarantees 
[Graham] employment with the Company for any set period of time, in any specific 
position, or at any specific rate of pay." 
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Under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement, if Burton Lumber terminated Graham with 
or without cause his right to receive any further share of the panel plant profits 
immediately terminated. Graham testified that he was not concerned about paragraph 7.4 
and that if Burton Lumber fired him he would go next door and set up his own business 
and run Burton Lumber out of business. [Finding 21] 
Graham nevertheless insists that he was not an at-will employee because he gave 
other consideration to Burton Lumber in addition to becoming an employee by selling 
Burton Lumber his business. This argument is factually incorrect because, as 
demonstrated by Scott Stuart's unrebutted expert testimony, Graham's business had no 
value whatsoever other than the value of its hard assets for which Graham was paid. 
[Finding 9]15 
15
 Beyond that, although it is true that some Utah cases have stated in dicta 
that an exception to the general rule that an employee at-will can be terminated without 
cause is where good consideration is given by the employee in addition to the services 
rendered, Graham has not cited one case actually applying that exception. The exception 
is inapplicable in the case at bar because even if it were assumed that Graham's sale of 
his business to Burton Lumber constituted good additional consideration (which it did 
not), Graham's agreement to sell is contained in the very same Agreement by which 
Graham agreed that he was an employee at-will, that he could be terminated at any time 
without cause and that upon termination he would have no further right to any 
compensation. In other words, there was no additional consideration given by Graham 
outside of the very Agreement by which he agreed to sell his business and to become an 
at-will employee who could be terminated at any time. Graham's argument that he was 
nevertheless not an at-will employee turns the Agreement on its head. 
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1 1 3i does the case la \ suppoi t: Graham's position that under the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing he could only be terminated for cause Ilie Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to 
loytiieiil contract into an employment for a specific term. See 
Hodgson v.Bunzl Utah, hu , MA P M ^ 1 m (i l|,,h \W? I- tlh>h<in\ Nordsthm lm 
812 P. 2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). The Supreme Court has also recognized that the covenant 
does not impose independcrt rights or rhitic^ not pun Med for in the contract. See 
'••""' ,- < * - *<* :.iM ' . tiic/iany, 812 
P.2dat55. 
c. Graham Suffered No Damages Because There Were No Profits. 
Finally, r\ <!ti" 11 il w vie cnoneously assumed for argument that Burton Lumber 
wrongfully terminated Graham in ordei I: :» a • - oidpa> inghim ashai e c f thepai lei plant 
profits, Graham, suffered no damages. The uncontradicted evidence at trial demonstrated 
that the wall panel plant lost money each year from 2001 through 2003, Burton Lumber's 
CFO, JoAnne Hall, Irsfifinl w li I IK mi it i niiirndu'hmi llial Hmli I iimhi i financial 
statements, which showed a substantial loss for 2001, 2002 and 2003, accurately reflected 
Burton Lumber's operation- rFinrling 24] Recognizing this feet and that he was unable 
to ,.:i ; t en .uiei . nnaucting exhaustive discovery 
of Burton Lumber's financial records - - Graham resoi ts to 1» ' agi le 1> coi i lplaii ling that 
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Burton Lumber marked up lumber sold to the wall panel plant and implies that Burton 
Lumber improperly allocated costs. Graham has, however, been unable to cite any 
evidence that these mark-ups and allocations were improper and there is none. Nor has 
Graham marshaled the substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding. 
The unsupported speculation of Graham's counsel did not substitute for admissible 
evidence. Graham did not even present any expert testimony. The only admissible 
evidence was that Burton Lumber lost money each year and that the mark-ups and 
allocations Burton Lumber made to the wall panel plant were perfectly proper. [Finding 
24; R. 3345 at pp. 647-645 & 667-670; R. 3347 at pp. 1396-1391; Pi's Exs. 43, 44 & 45; 
R. 3348 at pp. 1656-1657] Therefore, Graham would not have received any share of non-
existent profits even had he not been terminated. 
3. The Trial Court's Finding That Graham Is Not Entitled to Recover on 
His Unlawful Detainer Claim Is Not Clearly Erroneous. 
Graham argues in half a page that the trial court erred in its finding that Burton 
Lumber was not liable for his unlawful detainer (lease obligation) claim. [Aplt's Br. at p. 
47] Again, Graham has failed to adequately brief this issue or marshal the evidence and 
the court should refuse to consider the issue. 
The trial court found that Graham was not entitled to recover on his unlawful 
detainer claim because his Notice to Vacate was invalid as Burton Lumber had assumed 
all of Graham's obligations under the lease with the landlord, including the obligation to 
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premises until expiration of lease and Burton Lumber was not therefore a month to month 
tenant who could be evicted with a Notice to Vacate. [Finding 32] Moreover, the court 
.. . d that alter the Notice ID Vacate was served, Graham 01 ally agreec v..... jburton 
•few weeks after October 1 [Finding 33] The trial couit ak** ; Mind that Burton ! umbei 
paid the monthly lease payment for the panel plant nuv )cu ^  , - , . i * jialiam never 
tendered the payme tit 1: a :1 ;: tc Bui t on I umber , [I Ending 35] Fir •. • 
correctly found that Graham failed to prove that he suffered any damages or the amount 
of damages suffered by vii !ut- of RIP K^  Lumber remaining in the premises until October 
.IMIIIL : : !K . . AU ;..A . S, > . :. ,iamage t D the pi emises 
i } . • - - , 
4. The Trial Court's Findings That Graham Is Not Entitled to Recover on 
the Six Hamlet Jobs Graham Claimed Were for the Account of AHS 
Are Not Clearly Erroneous-
Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22 by arguing for the first time in this case long after he was 
terminated that even if he was not entitled to that check, Burton I Aimber owed him money 
on six i nil in:1 ir Hamlet Inu III in \^ cu: >ii|>post:cIl) AHS plr, ihilujii iv\n Ms IIIILS mender 
as!/,:-.:-piu in ins brief [Aplt's Br. at pp. 43-46] but fails to marshal the compelling 
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evidence supporting the trial court's decision or to adequately brief the issue. Not only 
did Graham never make such a contention until months after he was terminated, but 
Graham himself received all but one of the Hamlet checks on these six jobs and endorsed 
and/or delivered the checks to Burton Lumber. [Finding 38] Based upon extensive 
testimony and documentary evidence, which is ignored by Graham, the trial court 
correctly found that all of these six Hamlet jobs were Burton Lumber jobs. [Findings 38-
40] 
In making his argument on the six Hamlet jobs, Graham improperly refers to Judge 
Claudia Laycock's January 12, 2004 memorandum ruling granting Burton Lumber 
summary judgment on Graham's unconscionability and fraud counterclaims [R. 2379]. In 
that ruling, Judge Laycock inadvertently included in a section entitled "Undisputed Facts" 
(which included more than undisputed facts, including contentions of the parties) certain 
facts that were indeed disputed in connection with the summary judgment motion. 
However, the actual Partial Summary Judgment, which included the final Findings of 
Undisputed Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order that Judge Laycock directed be 
prepared and that Judge Howard later signed after he was assigned to the case, did not 
contain these disputed facts. [R. 2390] The Partial Summary Judgment was the binding 
order. The signed minute entry did not constitute the final order. See, Swenson 
Associates Architects P.C. v. State of Utah, 998 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994); State of Utah 
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v. Leatherbw y, 2003 I ] 1 2 65 P 3<: i 1 ] 8 0 1182 1183 1\ lore< >\ er, the trial c< n i II ., • ti 
motion, ruled that it would hear evidence at trial on the issues Judec ! cock had 
inadvertently stated in her memorandum ruling were undisputed j R 24 88; R. 3344 at pp. 
12-13] Pursuant to Rule 54(b), I Jtah Rules of CI v II Procedui. i^di^, .;udge Laycock's 
revision at any time before final judgment. See, MS Construction & Eng'g Co. v. 
Clearfield State Bank, 467 P.2d 410 (Utah 1970). 
^ j j j e j r l a j c o u r f s Finding That Burton I mm it c it: D id I" 'Ici Ill: C ci n * c i It \ ni • 
Equipment Is Not Clearly Erroneous, 
The trial court correctly found that Burton Lumber did not covert any personal 
property owned hi Giahan* in.cause Hur\M> .J::' I : ,• - ••• i- personal property 
the personal property that Graham contends was converted. [Pi's Ex. 5; Finding 29] 
Graham has failed to marshal the evidence supporting this finding and demonstrate it as 
insul licient to suppoi t the finding oi to adequately brief the Issue, [See, Aplf s Bi at p. 
6. The Trial Court's Findings That Burton Lumber Does Not Owe 
Graham His Final Salary Check or a Third Quarter Bonus Are Not 
Clearly Erroneous. 
salary check of $1,451.43 has been offset against the $7,293.00 owed by Graham on the 
A l 
Hamlet check pursuant to Robert Burton's September 5, 2001 letter, which was not 
objected to by Graham, as the trial court found. [Finding 22] Graham is not entitled to 
any third quarter bonus under paragraphs 7.2 and 7.4 of the Agreement because, as the 
trial court properly ruled, Graham was terminated before the bonus would have accrued. 
[Finding 23] 
Graham has not marshaled the evidence supporting these findings or demonstrated 
they are insufficient or adequately briefed these issues. 
7. The Trial Court's Finding That Graham Was Not Entitled to the 
Leased Truck is Not Clearly Erroneous, 
Graham's three line argument that he was entitled to the truck [Aplt's Br. at p. 44] 
is without merit because the trial court correctly found, under paragraph 7.2 of the 
Agreement, that Graham was only entitled to keep the truck if he was "fired without just 
cause." Burton Lumber fired Graham with cause. [Findings 11-19] In fact, the evidence 
established that at the August 28, 2001 meeting during which Graham's employment was 
terminated, he agreed to return the truck to Burton Lumber the next day. [Finding 18] 
8. Graham Is Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
Because the trial court's rulings in favor of Burton Lumber are supported by the 
evidence and Burton Lumber did not breach the Agreement, there is no basis for 
Graham's request for attorney's fees and costs. [Aplt's Br. at pp. 47-49] 
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ON APPEAL, 
Burton Lumber should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal 
under paragraph 9 of the Agreement [Pi's Ex. 5] Meadowbrook, L.L.C, v. Flower, 959 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.as Graham's appeal is frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the ti ial c> : ui I s 
judgment should be affirmc-* n ...! • -vets and that Burton Lumber should be awarded 
its fees and costs incurred - n app* ul 
DATED this the ^ ' c f a y of October, 2007. 
R "KBin 
Richard D. Burbidge ~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee Burton 
Lumber & Hardu ;ire Company 
A<) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the date below written, the undersigned hereby certifies that two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF was mailed with all postage pre-
paid to: 
David G. Harlow 
1855 North Oak Lane 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
DATED this the jp^day of October, 2007. 
ljto*a R ^ t fo^ufl 
P \DSchanuel\DSchanuel\DSchanuel\MyFiles\BurtonLumber\Graham\AppelleeBnefwpd 
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ADDENDUM A 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DATED NOVEMBER 7,2005 
FILED 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGr.. Sffl^f *£*?*?, ,Urt 
BURBIDGE & MITCHEI L * U t f i h C ° U n t * **• of U t a h 
Attorneys for Plaintiff .. / _ / , 
Parkside Tower " / l l0b mX nftp..»y 
215 South State, Suite 920 *^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-6677 
FOl «< HI JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
U i Ai 1 U >l JN'I Y. S S A I'll OF UTAH 
BURTON LUMBER 6c HARDWARE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
-(Propoacd)* 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010404278 
Judge Fred D Howard 
This case came on for an eight-day bench trial before the Honorable Fred D. 
Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, beginning on November 15, 2004 and ending on 
April 20, 2005. Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company ("Burton Lumber") was 
represented by Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell. Defendant Michael Graham 
("Graham") was represented by his attorney, David G. Harlow. The court having taken 
the matter under advi:,v.nicir. and ii.ivm^ issued its wntien killing on ilK- inauu mill being 
liillv advised in (lie prcrnisi •,, hereby eiilers liir follow ing hndings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Burton Lumber's Purchase of the Wall Panel Plant 
1. Graham owned and operated as a sole proprietorship a wall panel business in 
Provo, Utah that he started in 1995. Graham did business under the name of Advanced 
Home Systems ("AHS"). 
2. AHS manufactured wall panels for residential housing at AHS's plant. The 
wall panels would then be installed at the job site by subcontractors. 
3. Burton Lumber acquired Graham's wall panel business pursuant to an 
Agreement (the "Agreement") effective February 28, 2001. [Pi's Ex. 5] The 
Agreement closed on March 19, 2001, at which time Burton Lumber took over 
ownership and operations and Graham became General Manager of the wall panel 
plant. Under the express terms of the Agreement, Graham was an employee-at-will 
and could be terminated without cause at any time. Graham also signed a separate 
acknowledgment so stating. [Ex B to Pi's Ex. 5] 
4. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to pay 
Graham $54,175.00 for the fixed assets of the business. Burton Lumber also paid 
Graham approximately $4,400.00 for his inventory. Burton Lumber also agreed to pay 
Graham a $120,000.00 salary (which included a guaranteed $15,000 quarterly bonus) 
and fifty percent of any future net profits earned by Burton Lumber in the wall panel 
business during 2001, 2002 and 2003 up to a maximum purchase price of $500,000.00. 
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5. Graham actively negotiated the provisions of the Agreement with Burton 
Lumber. For example, Graham refused to agree to a non-competition provision unless 
he was paid substantial additional compensation for an agreement not to compete. 
Burton Lumber refused to pay additional compensation and a non-competition provision 
was deleted from the final Agreement. 
6. In negotiating the Agreement, Graham was advised both by an attorney and a 
CPA. 
Graham's Misrepresentations re. Profits 
7. During negotiations of the Agreement, Graham represented to Burton 
Lumber that he had earned $250,000 a year net profits from AHS. Graham represented 
in substance that with his expertise and contacts and Burton Lumber's financial 
strength, Burton Lumber could earn substantially more profits than AHS had earned. 
Based upon these representations, Burton Lumber agreed to pay Graham the salary and 
share of net profits described above. 
8. During negotiation of the Agreement, Burton Lumber requested that Graham 
provide financial statements to substantiate the profits he had earned operating AHS. 
Graham said he would do so, but then told Burton Lumber that his accountant was 
behind and financial statements were not yet prepared. Graham did not provide Burton 
Lumber with any financial statements or other financial documentation to substantiate 
his representations as to the profitability of AHS. 
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9. The only documents that Graham has that would substantiate the profits AHS 
had earned are his tax returns. Nevertheless, Graham refused for many months after 
Burton Lumber requested production of the tax returns in this case to produce any of 
his tax returns. Graham only produced his tax returns after Judge Claudia Lay cock 
granted Burton Lumber's motion to compel, ordered Graham to produce them and 
awarded sanctions against him for his refusal to produce the tax returns. Graham's tax 
returns reflect that he never earned any profits from AHS over and above a meager 
salary for his labor. His income from AHS ranged from a high of $33,582.00 in 1995 
to a low of $7,384.00 in 1998. For 2000, his income was $27,434.00. [Pi's Exs. 47 
thru 52] The court finds in accordance with the testimony of Burton Lumber's expert, 
Scott Stuart, whose testimony the court finds persuasive, that Graham's wall panel plant 
business was unprofitable for the six years prior to Burton Lumber's purchase of the 
business and that the business had no value other than the value of its fixed assets at the 
time Burton Lumber purchased the business. 
10. Graham's misrepresentations regarding the profitability of his business were 
material and were relied upon by Burton Lumber in purchasing Graham's business. 
However, given all the circumstances, including Burton Lumber's resources, business 
experience, sophistication and opportunity, its reliance upon such misrepresentations 
was not reasonable. Instead of waiting for the requested verification of Graham's 
represented profits, Burton Lumber completed the transaction relying upon Graham's 
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representations and its own limited research into the profitability of the wall panel 
business. Burton Lumber made no farther attempts to verify the profitability of the 
business until after the lawsuit was commenced. Burton Lumber had every opportunity 
to discover Graham's fraud by reviewing Graham's financial records. 
Graham's Theft of the Hamlet Check 
11. Hamlet Homes ("Hamlet") was one of the Burton Lumber wall panel plant's 
largest customers. After Burton Lumber acquired AHS, Hamlet continued to send 
Purchase Orders for wall panels to AHS and to make its checks for payment of the wall 
panels to AHS. Graham would then pick up the checks from Hamlet's office and 
endorse them over to Burton Lumber. 
12. As of late July 2001, Burton Lumber's records reflected that Hamlet had 
failed to make payment on two Burton Lumber invoices, Nos. 2800092 and 2800093, 
for wall panels supplied for lots 20 and 22, Kelvin Grove Subdivision in Springville. 
Burton Lumber contacted Hamlet concerning these invoices. Hamlet informed Burton 
Lumber that it had in fact paid the invoices. Hamlet provided Burton Lumber with the 
front and back of the check by which payment had been made. [Pi's Ex. 25] The 
payment in the amount of $7,293.00 was paid to AHS on May 15, 2001. Graham 
picked up the check at Hamlet's office on that date and cashed it at his bank on June 1, 
2001. 
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13. When Burton Lumber's President, Dan Burton, first discussed the Hamlet 
check with Graham, he stated he did not know what happened with the check and was 
researching the check. Graham then told Klay Clawson, a Burton Lumber employee, 
that Graham may have left the check in his pocket and his wife had mistakenly cashed 
the check. In her deposition, Graham's wife denied that she had ever found any checks 
in Graham's clothes and cashed them. 
14. After investigation, Burton Lumber determined that Graham himself had 
endorsed the Hamlet check and cashed it at Wells Fargo Bank on University Avenue in 
Provo. He had then taken $2,000.00 of the cash and immediately deposited it into his 
wife's account. The balance was deposited into Graham's account. Graham was 
ultimately forced to admit that he cashed the check and deposited the proceeds in his 
account and his wife's account. 
15. Graham has contended for the first time after this case was filed that the 
work on Lots 20 and 22 was done before Burton Lumber took over the wall panel plant 
and that he was entitled to keep the check. However, the $7,293.00 Hamlet check for 
wall panels supplied for Kelvin Grove lots 20 and 22 clearly belonged to Burton 
Lumber as demonstrated by the time line contained in Plaintiff's Ex. 72: 
(a) Burton Lumber took over the operation of the wall panel plant on March 
19, 2001. [See, e ^ , Pi's Exs. 7, 8, 9 & 10] At that time, all AHS business was to 
immediately cease and all business was to be conducted by Burton Lumber. [Pi's Ex. 5, 
6 
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an ongoing basis and never took the position that lots 20 and 22 were AHS jobs even 
though he did have the log revised to delete two jobs that were not Burton Lumber 
jobs. [Pi's Exs. 21 & 22] 
(h) Klay Clawson ("Clawson") prepared Burton Lumber's invoices to 
Hamlet for lots 20 and 22. [Pi's Ex. 19, Bates No. B04389; Pi's Ex. 29, Bates No. 
B04401] He received the information to prepare the invoices from Graham who did 
not tell Clawson that on May 1, 2001 Graham had signed the Hamlet Purchase Orders 
and submitted them to Hamlet to obtain payment for lots 20 and 22 or that Graham was 
paid $7,293.00 for these jobs on May 15, 2001, and embezzled the money. 
16. The court finds Graham's testimony with respect to the Hamlet check (and 
in other areas) to be unreliable and lacking in veracity and credibility. Instead of 
telling Dan Burton and others at Burton Lumber that he cashed the check when he 
clearly knew he had done so and knew the check belonged to Burton Lumber, Graham 
made up false excuses and sent Burton Lumber on a wild goose chase to track down the 
check. Graham's testimony that he worked on wall panels for Lots 20 and 22 before 
receiving any purchase orders is implausible and inconsistent with the other evidence 
and is rejected by the court. Graham's excuse that he did not remember cashing the 
check is disingenuous. 
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Graham's Termination 
17. After learning of Graham's dishonesty, Dan Burton decided to terminate him 
but did not want to do so immediately to avoid any adverse effect on a customer's job 
in progress in Nauvoo, Illinois. 
18. On August 28, 2001, Dan Burton and Jeff Burton, President and Vice 
President of Burton Lumber, respectively, met with Graham at Burton Lumber's offices 
in Salt Lake City. At that meeting, after first contending that he thought the money 
belonged to him for a job done on Lot 70, Graham admitted cashing the Hamlet check, 
that the money belonged to Burton Lumber and that he owed Burton Lumber $7,293.00 
for that check. Graham stated that he would repay Burton Lumber that amount on 
August 31, 2001, three days after the meeting. Graham also agreed to turn in the next 
day the company truck he was using. Burton Lumber terminated Graham at the 
meeting effective immediately. [See Pi's Ex. 39] Burton Lumber acted in good faith in 
terminating Graham based on its good faith and reasonable belief - - consistent with the 
court's finding - - that Graham had embezzled the Hamlet check. Graham's 
explanations to Burton Lumber concerning the check were inadequate and incredulous. 
Following termination, Graham fabricated the story that the check rightfully belonged 
to him for his work on Lots 20 and 22. Burton Lumber did not terminate Graham to 
avoid paying him a share of the wall panel plant profits (of which there were none). 
Although Graham was an employee-at-will and could be terminated at any time without 
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cause, Burton Lumber had just cause for terminating him for dishonesty. Burton 
Lumber's decision to terminate Graham was not based on any advice or 
recommendation from International Profit Associates. Graham did not repay the 
$7,293.00 or turn in the company truck as promised. Burton Lumber was later able to 
repossess that truck. 
19. Under the Agreement, Graham was entitled to keep the truck Burton 
Lumber leased for him and to receive title to the truck if he was terminated "without 
just cause." Because Burton Lumber terminated Graham with just cause, Graham had 
no right to the truck after he was terminated. 
20. Under paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement, if Burton Lumber terminated 
Graham with or without cause his right to receive any further share of the panel plant 
profits immediately terminated. A provision more favorable to Graham had been 
included in the earlier drafts of the Agreement, but was changed when the non-
competition provision was deleted. Graham unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a 
$100,000 payment from Burton Lumber if he were terminated for cause. 
21. Graham was not concerned with the termination provision contained in 
paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement because if he were terminated he intended to 
immediately go into business for himself next door and "run them [Burton Lumber] out 
of business." 
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22. On September 5, 2001, shortly after Graham was terminated, Burton 
Lumber's General Counsel, Robert Burton sent Graham a letter stating that Burton 
Lumber proposed to apply Graham's final salary check in the amount of $1,451.43 
toward the $7,293.00 owed by Graham to Burton Lumber on the Hamlet check and that 
if Graham disagreed with Burton Lumber doing so to notify Mr. Burton. [Pi's Ex. 40] 
Graham did not object and thereby acquiesced in Burton Lumber crediting his salary 
check to his debt. Graham is entitled to a credit for the amount of the final salary 
check against the $7,193.00 owed on the Hamlet check. Thus, the net principal amount 
owed by Graham on the Hamlet check is $5,841.57. 
23. Graham was not entitled to a third quarter 2001 bonus. That bonus would 
have only accrued at the September 30 end of the third quarter and was not payable 
until October. [Plaintiff's Ex. 5, ^7.2] Graham had already been terminated before that 
date. Under paragraph 7.2 of the Agreement, Graham had to still be employed by 
Burton Lumber at the time a bonus was due to receive a bonus. Further, under 
paragraph 7.4 of the Agreement, if Burton Lumber terminated Graham with or without 
cause, his right to receive any bonus terminated. 
24. Even if Graham had not been terminated, Burton Lumber's wall panel plant 
did not earn any profits in which Graham could have shared. Burton Lumber's wall 
panel plant lost $50,645.86 in 2001, $49,390.90 in 2002 and $227,570.87 in 2003. 
[Pi's Exs. 43, 44 & 45] 
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The Phony Jason Current Invoice for $2,148.00 
25. After Graham was terminated, Burton Lumber learned of another dishonest 
act that Graham had committed. Unbeknownst to Graham's superiors at Burton 
Lumber, Graham had purchased a generator to personally rent to contractors on Burton 
Lumber jobs where there was no temporary power. Graham caused Burton Lumber to 
include a rental charge for the generator in its bid on the "Bowen job" and collect for 
the generator. Graham then approached Jason Current ("Current"), a subcontractor 
who installed wall panels for Burton Lumber, and had him phony up on a rush basis an 
invoice to Burton Lumber for $2,148.00 for work on the Bowen job that Current 
admitted he was not involved in and for work that Current did not in fact perform. [PFs 
Exs. 26 & 42] Graham caused Burton Lumber to issue a check to Current for 
$2,148.00 the next business day. [Pi's Exs. 27 & 42] Graham gave the check to 
Current and instructed Current to simultaneously give Graham a check for the 
$2,148.00, which Current did. [Pi's Exs. 28 & 42] Although Graham has attempted to 
contend that he and Current were partners, Current was not a partner of Graham's in 
renting generators and never agreed to any such relationship. Graham received the 
entire $2,148.00, did not pay Current any portion of the profit and did not use the 
money to purchase any other generator in which Current would have an interest. 
Graham did not request or receive permission from Burton Lumber to rent generators 
on Burton Lumber jobs and Graham's superiors at Burton Lumber had no knowledge 
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he was doing so. By this subterfuge, Graham received a secret profit of $2,148.00 on a 
Burton Lumber job and usurped a corporate opportunity of Burton Lumber. 
The Alleged Improperly Claimed Business Expenses. 
26. After learning about the stolen Hamlet check, Dan Burton investigated other 
areas to determine if Graham had stolen other money from Burton Lumber. As a result 
of the investigation, Burton Lumber determined that Graham had been paid for expense 
reimbursements that did not appear to be proper business expenses. However, the 
evidence demonstrates that Graham timely and properly submitted these expenses to 
Burton Lumber following regular procedures of submission and review and that Burton 
Lumber approved the expenses. If Burton Lumber had concerns whether these 
expenses were legitimate, it should have conducted an investigation before approving 
the expenses. Burton Lumber waived any complaint as to the legitimacy of these 
claimed business expenses and there was insufficient evidence to establish that Graham 
improperly claimed business expenses for which Burton Lumber should be reimbursed. 
Graham's Conversion of Burton Lumber's Personal Property, 
27. Under the Agreement, Burton Lumber acquired all of the assets of the wall 
panel business except accounts receivable and personal assets of Graham such as his 
"home, furniture, cars, and clothing." Graham was supposed to make a list of all of 
the assets. [Plaintiffs Ex. 5, 111.1 and 1.6] Rather than making a list of all of the 
assets, Graham listed what he informed Burton Lumber were the main assets of the 
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business for which he was paid by Burton Lumber and informed Steve Hawkes that all 
other business assets were included. [See Asset Schedule attached as an exhibit to 
Plaintiffs Ex. 5] Graham set the total value of these assets at $54,175 and Burton 
Lumber agreed to and did pay that value as fair value of all of the fixed assets. The 
court finds the testimony of Dan Burton and Steven Hawkes in this regard persuasive. 
28. After Graham was terminated, he took possession of and converted the 
following items belonging to Burton Lumber outlined in Burton Lumber's Ex. 63: 
ITEM AMOUNT 
Truck Lease Expense 
Music CDs 
Computer Software 
Printer and Cable 
Personal Truck Accessories 
Notebook Case 
Two (2) Skill Saws 
Two (2) Miter Saws 
Merrick Machine Co. Hardware 
Convertor for Lap Top 
Palm Digital Camera 
Medium Digital Camera 
Saw Blades 
Forklift Extensions 
10" Makita Compound Slide Saw 
Green Horizontal Boring Machine 
123" Delta Power Plane 
Two (2) Duo-Fast Nail Guns 
$1,123.57 
26.48 
297.47 
345.50 
177.20 
59.99 
318.00 
85.92 
518.10 
85.27 
499.99 
19.99 
753.31 
800.00 
499.00 
1,049.00 
409.00 
450.00 
These items belonged to Burton Lumber under the Agreement. Consequently, Graham 
unlawfully converted these items and Burton Lumber is entitled to recover their value 
in the amount of $7,517.59. 
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Burton Lumber's Alleged Conversion of Graham's Personal Property, 
29. Burton Lumber did not convert any personal property owned by Graham. 
Burton Lumber owned all of the personal property that Graham left at the wall panel 
plant premises when he was terminated, including the personal property listed in 
Plaintiff's Ex. 29 that Graham contends was converted. In this regard, Dan Burton and 
Steve Hawkes conceded that Graham's Gooseneck trailer and van were not part of the 
sale and Graham was entitled to those items. 
The Notice to Vacate 
30. Under the terms of the Agreement, Burton Lumber agreed to assume all of 
Graham's ongoing obligations under his lease with the landlord for the panel plant. 
Although Burton Lumber decided not to have the lease assigned to it, Burton Lumber 
did in fact assume and pay Graham's ongoing obligations under the lease, including the 
monthly lease payments. 
31. On September 7, 2001 (ten days after he was terminated), Graham served a 
Notice to Vacate on Burton Lumber, giving Burton Lumber notice of his demand that 
Burton Lumber vacate the panel plant premises no later than October 1, 2001. 
32. The Notice to Vacate was invalid because Burton Lumber had assumed all 
of Graham's obligations under the lease with the landlord, including the obligation to 
pay rent until expiration of the lease and had the corresponding right to occupy the 
premises until expiration of the Lease. Thus, Burton Lumber was not a month-to-
15 
month tenant. Nevertheless, Burton Lumber wanted a bigger plant with a better 
location anyway and, after receiving the Notice to Vacate, decided to vacate the panel 
plant as soon as it could locate alternative space to operate the business. 
33. Klay Clawson, who was then the manager of the wall panel plant, told 
Graham that Burton Lumber would not be able to vacate for a few weeks after October 
1. Graham told Clawson that was okay and thereby agreed that Burton Lumber could 
have a few weeks after October 1 to vacate the premises. 
34. Burton Lumber subsequently found alternative space and vacated the panel 
plant on October 25, 2001. 
35. Burton Lumber paid the landlord the monthly lease payment on the panel 
plant for October 2001 in the amount of $1,705.29. [Pi's Ex. 46] Graham never 
tendered this payment back to Burton Lumber. 
36. Graham failed to prove that he suffered any damages or the amount of 
damages suffered by virtue of Burton Lumber remaining in the premises until October 
25,2001. 
The Alleged Waste to the Premises, 
37. Burton Lumber did not do any damage to the panel plant. Any damage to 
the panel plant had been done by AHS before Burton Lumber acquired the panel plant. 
Moreover, at the time Graham claims damage was done to the panel plant, he was the 
General Manager of the plant and responsible for its care and maintenance. He had the 
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duty as General Manager to ensure that the plant premises were properly maintained. 
There was no evidence that Graham reported any damage to his superiors at Burton 
Lumber or caused his employees to repair damages he now claims they did under his 
supervision. 
The Six Other Hamlet Jobs Graham Claims Were for the Account of AHS. 
38. Graham contended for the first time long after this lawsuit was filed that 
Burton Lumber owed him money on six Hamlet jobs in addition to Lots 20 and 22 that 
Graham claims were AHS jobs. These jobs are the following: Muirfield Lot 443, Glen 
Eagles Lots 109 and 114, and Shetland Meadows Lots 36, 70 and 82. Graham himself 
received all but one of the Hamlet checks on these jobs and endorsed and/or delivered the 
checks to Burton Lumber. Graham never contended that these jobs were AHS jobs until 
months after he was terminated. The court concludes that each of these jobs was in fact a 
Burton Lumber job and that Graham is not entitled to recover any sums relating to these 
jobs. 
39. Each of the six jobs was included as a Burton Lumber job on the Burton 
Lumber work order log that was maintained under Graham's supervision and direction 
and that he reviewed on an ongoing basis. Graham never deleted these jobs even though 
he changed the log to delete two other jobs that did not belong to Burton Lumber. [See 
Plaintiffs Ex. 21, BateNos. 01080 and 01079] 
40. Plaintiffs Ex. 73, which is a time line summarizing the relevant dates with 
respect to these jobs, plainly demonstrates that these lots were Burton Lumber jobs: 
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Muirfield Lot 443 
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham started working for Burton Lumber 
on March 19, 2001. The wall panels were delivered to the job site by Out of the 
Woods Crane Enterprises and erected on site on March 28 and 29. Hamlet paid AHS 
for the wall panels on this lot on April 16. Graham endorsed the check over to Burton 
Lumber, thereby evidencing his knowledge that the payment for this lot belonged to 
Burton Lumber. 
Glen Eagles Lot 109 
The site construction did not start on this house until March 27, 2001, eight days 
after Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. 
Anderson Lumber did not deliver the materials to Burton Lumber for this job until 
March 29. Graham signed a Hamlet Purchase Order to obtain payment on this job on 
April 6. The wall panels were delivered to the job site by the crane company and 
erected on site on April 7. Hamlet paid AHS on April 30 and Graham again endorsed 
the check to Burton Lumber, acknowledging that the job belonged to Burton Lumber. 
Glen Eagles Lot 114 
The site construction on this house started on March 27, 2001, eight days after 
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. Hamlet 
delivered its Purchase Order for this job on March 29. Anderson Lumber delivered the 
materials for this job on March 29. The wall panels were delivered to the job site by 
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the crane company and erected on site on April 5. Graham signed the Hamlet Purchase 
Order to obtain payment on April 6. Hamlet paid AHS for this job on April 30. 
Again, Graham endorsed the check to Burton Lumber, acknowledging that the job 
belonged to Burton Lumber. 
Shetland Meadows Lot 36 
The site construction started on this house on March 27, 2001, eight days after 
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. 
Anderson Lumber delivered the materials to Burton Lumber for this job on March 29. 
Burton Lumber invoiced Hamlet for the job on April 27. Graham approved all 
invoices. Graham picked up the Hamlet check for Burton Lumber on May 15, at the 
same time that he picked up the check for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22. Graham 
endorsed and delivered the check for Lot 36 to Burton Lumber, again recognizing the 
job belonged to Burton Lumber. 
Shetland Meadows Lot 82 
The site construction started on this house on March 22, 2001, three days after 
Burton Lumber acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. 
Anderson Lumber delivered the materials to Burton Lumber for this job on March 29. 
Burton Lumber invoiced Hamlet on April 27. Graham approved all invoices. Graham 
picked up the check for this job from Hamlet on May 15, at the same time that he 
picked up the check for Kelvin Grove Lots 20 and 22. By endorsing and delivering the 
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Hamlet check for Lot 82 to Burton Lumber, Graham again acknowledged that the job 
belonged to Burton Lumber. 
Shetland Meadows Lot 70 
The buyer selections for this lot that would have to be made before walls could 
be constructed were made on March 22, 2001, three days after Burton Lumber 
acquired AHS and Graham went to work for Burton Lumber. The site construction of 
the house started on April 17, 2001, almost a month after the acquisition. Anderson 
Lumber delivered to the job site the materials to Burton Lumber for this job on April 
25. The wall panels were delivered by the crane company and erected on site on April 
30 and May 2, six weeks after Burton Lumber acquired AHS. Burton Lumber invoiced 
Hamlet on September 10. Hamlet paid Burton Lumber on September 28. This lot was 
clearly a Burton Lumber job. 
Punitive Damages 
41. The court finds that in embezzling the Hamlet check, obtaining the secret 
profit from the rental of his generator and converting Burton Lumber's personal 
property, Graham acted fraudulently, willfully, maliciously and with the intent to 
damage Burton Lumber or in reckless disregard of Burton Lumber's rights. Therefore, 
punitive damages should be awarded against Graham in an amount to be determined by 
the court at a future hearing. 
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Attorney's Fees 
42. Paragraph 9 of the Agreement contains the following attorney's fee 
provision: 
Indemnity. All of the representations, warranties, and covenants in 
this Agreement and the obligations of the parties with respect thereto shall 
survive the Closing. Seller agrees that he will indemnify, defend, protect 
and hold harmless Buyer and its employees from and against all liabilities, 
claims, damages, actions, demands, assessments, adjustments, penalties, 
losses, costs and expenses whatsoever (including court costs and 
attorneys' fees) that arise as a result of or incident to the following: 
Occurrences before the Closing Date; any breach of, misrepresentation in, 
untruth in or inaccuracy in the representations and warranties by Seller; 
non-fulfillment or non-performance of any agreement, covenant or 
condition on the part of Seller made in this Agreement or an [sic] any 
other document delivered pursuant to this Agreement. 
43. With the exception of Graham's defense to Burton Lumber's 
misrepresentation of profits and reimbursement of personal expense claims, Graham's 
claims and defenses in this action are without merit and were asserted in bad faith. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court hereby enters the following 
conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
To the extent that any of the foregoing findings of fact constitute conclusions of 
law, the court incorporates such findings into these conclusions. Similarly, to the 
extent that the following conclusions also constitute findings of fact, the court 
incorporates such conclusions into the court's findings. 
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1. Graham embezzled the $7,293.00 Hamlet check and converted that check on 
May 15, 2001, thus breaching his Agreement with Burton Lumber. Burton Lumber is 
therefore entitled to recover from Graham the sum of $7,293.00, less an offset of 
$1,451.43 which is the amount of Graham's final salary check, or a net recovery of 
$5,841.57, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from May 15, 2001. 
2. Graham obtained a secret profit and usurped Burton Lumber's corporate 
opportunity in the amount of $2,148.00 in breach of his Agreement with Burton 
Lumber through the subterfuge of submitting a phony invoice to Burton Lumber from 
one of its subcontractors, Jason Current, and then having Mr. Current pay that money 
to Graham. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover the amount of this secret profit of 
$2,148.00, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from August 20, 2001. 
3. Graham converted the personal property belonging to Burton Lumber 
described in Finding No. 28 above that Graham had agreed to sell to Burton Lumber, 
thereby breaching his Agreement with Burton Lumber. Burton Lumber is therefore 
entitled to recover the value of the personal property in the amount of $7,517.59, plus 
pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from August 28, 2001. 
4. Graham breached his fiduciary duty to Burton Lumber and was unjustly 
enriched by virtue of the conduct described in conclusions 1 through 3. 
5. There is insufficient evidence to establish that Graham received improper 
reimbursement of personal expenses and Burton Lumber has waived any such claim. 
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6. Although Graham materially misrepresented to Burton Lumber that he had 
earned $250,000 a year net profits in his wall panel business and Burton Lumber relied 
upon that representation in purchasing Graham's business, Burton Lumber did not 
reasonably rely on the misrepresentation and is therefore not entitled to recover for 
fraud. 
7. Burton Lumber had just cause for terminating Graham because of his 
dishonesty in embezzling the $7,293.00 Hamlet check. Even if, contrary to this court's 
finding, Graham did not embezzle the check, Burton Lumber terminated Graham based 
upon the reasonable good faith belief that he had embezzled the check. Burton Lumber 
did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or breach the 
Agreement between the parties. 
8. In any event, Graham did not lose any share of profits as a result of his 
termination by Burton Lumber because Burton Lumber's wall panel plant business did 
not earn any profits during 2001, 2002 or 2003, but instead lost money each year. 
9. Burton Lumber did not convert the truck it leased for Graham. Because 
Graham was terminated for just cause, Graham had no right to the truck after he was 
terminated by Burton Lumber. 
10. Burton Lumber did not convert any of Graham's personal property or 
commit trespass thereto. All of the personal property that Graham alleges was 
converted belonged to Burton Lumber under the Agreement as Burton Lumber 
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purchased all of the assets utilized in the wall panel plant business other than accounts 
receivable and Graham's personal assets such as his "home, furniture, cars, and 
clothing." 
11. Muirfield Lot 443, Glen Eagles Lots 109 and 114 and Shetland Meadows 
Lots 36, 70 and 82 were Burton Lumber jobs and Graham is not entitled to any 
recovery or offset with respect to these jobs. 
12. There is no basis for imposition of a constructive trust in Graham's favor as 
Burton Lumber had just cause for terminating Graham, there were no profits earned by 
the wall panel plant in the period 2001-2003 that Graham would have been entitled to 
share in had he not been terminated, Burton Lumber was not unjustly enriched, there is 
no res to which a constructive trust could attach and Graham's remedies, if any, would 
be based on the Agreement. 
13. Burton Lumber was not guilty of unlawful detainer because it was not a 
month-to-month tenant and the notice to vacate was invalid and because Graham orally 
agreed that Burton Lumber could have a few weeks after October 1, 2001 in which to 
vacate the premises. In any event, Graham has failed to prove any damages arising 
from the fact that Burton Lumber did not vacate the premises until October 25, 2001. 
14. Burton Lumber did not trespass on the premises as Burton Lumber was in 
lawful occupancy thereof until it vacated on October 25, 2001. 
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15. Graham is not entitled to recover on his Counterclaim for waste because any 
damage to the panel plant was done prior to the time that Burton Lumber acquired 
Graham's business and even if damage had been done to the panel plant after that time, 
Graham had the responsibility for supervising and maintaining the panel plant. 
16. Punitive damages should be awarded against Graham in an amount to be 
determined after further hearing. 
17. Graham breached the Agreement to sell Burton Lumber all of the assets of 
his business other than accounts receivable and personal assets by taking and converting 
the assets described in paragraph 28 above. Graham further breached the Agreement 
under which all business done after March 19, 2001 was agreed to be for the benefit of 
Burton Lumber by taking, converting and embezzling the $7,293.00 Hamlet check. 
Graham further breached the employment provisions of paragraph 7 of the Agreement, 
including paragraph 7.3 which obligated him to work full time for Burton Lumber and 
not to "work in other business pursuits" by renting generators on Burton Lumber jobs 
without Burton Lumber's knowledge or consent and obtaining the $2,148.00 secret 
profit as described in paragraph 25 above. Consequently, Burton Lumber is entitled to 
recover its attorney's fees in prosecuting these claims in an amount to be determined 
after further hearing. Further, Graham's defense of all of Burton Lumber's claims, 
except the misrepresentation of profits and expense reimbursement claims, and the 
counterclaims asserted by Graham against Burton Lumber were without merit and not 
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brought or asserted in good faith. Thus, Burton Lumber is entitled to recover 
attorney's fees with respect to all claims except the misrepresentation of profits and the 
expense reimbursement claims pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56. 
18. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover its taxable costs incurred herein from 
Graham. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of A/J/jihnfi/y^ , 2005. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on 
the ^?g> day of <C)to*tJL^ , 2005: 
David G. Harlow, Esq. 
1855 North Oak Lane 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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ADDENDUM B 
PLAINTIFF BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE COMPANY'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES DATED AUGUST 17, 
2006 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-6677 
F ILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
-l/pfa m Deputy 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF BURTON LUMBER & 
HARDWARE COMPANY'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Civil No. 010404278 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
The hearing on the amount of attorneys' fees and punitive damages to be awarded 
to Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company ("Burton Lumber") in this action was held 
on June 29, 2006 before the Honorable Fred D. Howard, Fourth District Court Judge. 
Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell appeared on behalf of Burton Lumber. 
David G. Harlow appeared on behalf of Defendant Michael Graham ("Graham"). The 
court having heard and considered the evidence presented by the parties and the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Burton Lumber incurred attorneys' fees in prosecuting its claims and 
defending the counterclaims asserted by Graham in this action in the amount of 
$164,933.75. Burton Lumber incurred additional attorneys' fees of $6,027.50 with 
respect to the hearing on the amount of attorneys' fees and punitive damages and 
preparation of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Judgement 
with respect thereto. Thus, the total attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber in this 
action is the amount of $170,961.25. This amount is exclusive of attorneys' fees 
incurred by Burton Lumber with respect to its fraud claim against Graham which was 
dismissed by the court. 
2. In support of its claim for attorneys' fees, Burton Lumber presented the 
affidavit and testimony of its lead counsel, Richard D. Burbidge, and all of its billing 
records. Burbidge & Mitchell's time records are kept by attorneys at Burbidge & 
Mitchell by hand and then those time records on cases are typed up as the billing 
statement. There is no additional detail in the time records kept by individual attorneys 
other than what is included in the bills. 
3. When this case was originally filed, Robert Burton represented Burton 
Lumber and expended a substantial number of hours representing Burton Lumber in 
this case with respect to which Burton Lumber is not claiming any reimbursement. 
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4. The normal hourly rate charged by Richard D. Burbidge for legal services is 
$350.00 per hour. The normal hourly rate of Stephen B. Mitchell charged for his legal 
services is $310.00 an hour. Messrs. Burbidge and Mitchell performed the vast bulk of 
the legal services performed for Burton Lumber in this action. Nevertheless, Burton 
Lumber was billed and paid for their legal services at the substantially reduced rate of 
$200.00 per hour based upon the relationship between Burbidge & Mitchell and Burton 
Lumber. Graham obtained the benefit of this substantially reduced billing rate. The 
time of associates and paralegals at Burbidge & Mitchell was billed at their normal 
rates ranging from $40.00 to $165.00. 
5. The legal services performed by Burbidge & Mitchell on behalf of Burton 
Lumber and the legal fees incurred with respect thereto were necessary, reasonable and 
appropriate. Both the hourly rates and the amount of attorneys' fees charged by 
Burbidge & Mitchell to Burton Lumber in this action were reasonable and customary 
according to the custom and practice in both Salt Lake County and Utah County 
considering the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of Burton Lumber's counsel in 
presenting the case, the expertise and experience of the attorneys representing Burton 
Lumber and the result obtained, including successfully defending the counterclaims 
asserted by Graham against Burton Lumber of approximately $1.5 Million. In this 
regard, the amount of attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber was substantially 
increased as a result of Graham's litigation strategy, including the taking of numerous 
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lengthy depositions, requesting and receiving many thousands of pages of documents, 
and lengthy questioning of witnesses and calling at best tangentially relevant witnesses 
at trial which significantly lengthened the trial. 
6. Burton Lumber has allocated to the fraud claim and has deducted from the 
amount of attorneys' fees for which reimbursement is sought more than the amount of 
time actually expended in pursuing the fraud claim which was dismissed by the court. 
Moreover, almost all, if not all, of the legal services performed with respect to the 
fraud claim were also relevant and necessary with respect to other issues in the case 
upon which Burton Lumber was successful. For example, the fact established by 
Burton Lumber that Graham's business had no value other than the value of its hard 
assets was relevant to Graham's unconscionability, fraud and breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, among others. As a further example, 
the fact established by Burton Lumber that Graham misrepresented that he had earned 
net profits of $250,000 per year in his business when in fact he had not earned any 
profits in excess of a small salary for himself was also relevant these claims, as well as 
being relevant to Graham's credibility, including the credibility of his explanations for 
taking the Hamlet Homes check that belonged to Burton Lumber and his purported 
justification for the phony Jason Current invoice of $2,148. 
7. Burton Lumber did not allocate any time to the prosecution of its improper 
expense reimbursement claim that the court dismissed. The amount of time involved 
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was minimal. Further, almost all, if not all, of the legal services devoted to this issue 
were necessary and relevant with respect to Graham's credibility in this case, including 
his credibility with respect to the matters set forth in Finding No. 6. 
8. Burton Lumber did not allocate any fees to the issues on which it was 
unsuccessful on summary judgment, but on which Burton Lumber prevailed at trial and 
the court has concluded such an allocation is not legally required. In any event, almost 
all, if not all, of the legal services provided with respect to such issues would have been 
necessary in preparing for and conducting the trial. In other words, such legal services 
were not duplicated at trial and were utilized by Burton Lumber at trial. 
9. The court has found that Graham's defense of Burton Lumber's claims on 
which it was successful and his prosecution of his counterclaims was in bad faith and 
that such defenses and claims were without merit. Burton Lumber would not have 
incurred any attorneys' fees or costs for a summary judgment motion on the claims on 
which Burton Lumber ultimately prevailed if Graham had not defended and prosecuted 
such frivolous claims and defenses in bad faith. 
10. Although the court does not believe that any further reduction of fees is 
required, the court finds based upon the evidence presented and the court's review of 
Burbidge & Mitchell's billings, the pleadings, including the summary judgment 
memoranda and trial briefs, that a further reduction of $5,000 will more than 
compensate for any fees incurred by Burton Lumber with respect to the improper 
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expense reimbursement claim, the motion for summary judgment with respect to claims 
that were not dismissed at the summary judgment stage and the claims originally 
alleged by Burton Lumber, but not alleged in the Amended Complaint. 
11. Graham is entitled to a credit against the amount of attorneys' fees incurred 
by Burton Lumber in the amount of $1,500.00 for sanctions previously paid by Graham 
to Burton Lumber constituting partial reimbursement of Burton Lumber's attorneys' 
fees incurred in connection with motions to compel. 
12. Thus, the net amount of reasonable attorneys' fees that Burton Lumber is 
entitled to recover from Graham is $164,461.25. 
Punitive Damages 
13. Graham's current annual income is approximately $40,000. Graham's tax 
returns introduced into evidence at the attorneys' fee hearing reflect that his annual 
income was $60,654 in 2001; $33,065 in 2002; $61,943 in 2003 and $57,548 in 2004. 
His net worth is approximately $12,000 according to Graham's testimony. 
14. The nature of Graham's dishonest conduct and the facts and circumstances 
surrounding that conduct as described more fully in the court's previous Findings of 
Fact entered in this action are reprehensible especially given the fiduciary duties that 
Graham owed to Burton Lumber as the General Manager of its wall panel plant. 
Graham stole from Burton Lumber and then lied about his theft and made up 
preposterous lies and excuses to attempt to conceal his dishonesty. Graham then forced 
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Burton Lumber to incur very substantial attorneys' fees to defend Graham's frivolous 
counterclaims, which Graham asserted in bad faith, and in order to recover the monies 
owed by Graham to Burton Lumber for theft of the Hamlet Homes check, the phony 
Jason Current invoice paid by Burton Lumber and Burton Lumber's personal property 
stolen by Graham. 
15. Not only was Burton Lumber forced to incur very substantial attorneys' fees, 
but Graham's dishonesty and wrongful prosecution and defense of this lawsuit forced 
Burton Lumber management and employees to spend hundreds of hours to defend 
against Graham's counterclaims and support the claims asserted by Burton Lumber 
against Graham. This time included preparing for and appearing at numerous lengthy 
depositions taken by Graham, assembling, analyzing and producing many thousands of 
pages of Burton Lumber documents and preparing for and testifying at trial. 
16. The court finds there is a probability that Graham may engage in dishonest 
business conduct in the future. Graham testified falsely at trial concerning his actions. 
At the June 29, 2006 hearing,*Graham admitted he had "ripped off Burton Lumber 
and may do it again if he sold another business. Graham has never apologized to 
Burton Lumber for his actions. 
17. The actual principal amount of the damages awarded to Burton Lumber with 
respect to Graham's dishonest conduct was^ $16,958.00. 
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18. It is reasonable to award punitive damages against Graham in the amount of 
$34,000.00, or approximately two times the actual damages awarded against Graham. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court hereby enters the following 
conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
To the extent that any of the foregoing findings of fact constitute conclusions of 
law, the court incorporates such findings into these conclusions. Similarly, to the 
extent that the following conclusions also constitute findings of fact, the court 
incorporates such conclusions into the court's findings. 
Attorneys' Fees 
1. Burton Lumber should be awarded its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in 
prosecuting its Complaint and defending Graham's counterclaims in the amount of 
$164,461.25. This amount does not include the fees incurred with respect to Burton 
Lumber's fraud claim and the court has further reduced the fees requested by $5,000 
which the court does not believe is required by the law but is being made to more than 
compensate for any fees charged with respect to the improper expense reimbursement 
claim, the summary judgment motion with respect to claims not dismissed on summary 
judgment and claims originally alleged by Burton Lumber, but not alleged in its 
Amended Complaint. 
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2. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover pre-judgment interest on the attorneys' 
fees awarded at the legal rate. 
3. Cache County v. Beus, 2005 UT App. 204, 128 P.3d 63, cited by Graham, 
does not apply in the case at bar. In that case, both parties moved for summary 
judgment as to whether Cache County had breached a lease. The trial court ruled that 
Cache County had not breached the Lease.1 On the first appeal ("Cache County I"), 
the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment that the County had not breached 
the Lease, ruling that the County had breached the Lease between the parties, but 
remanded the case to the trial court on the issue of substantial compliance, stating that 
material fact issues existed "concerning the adverse consequences of forfeiture suffered 
by Cache County in relation to the damages suffered by" defendants because of the 
County's breach. On remand, the trial court ruled in favor of the County that the 
Lease remained in full force and effect, that ejectment was not a proper remedy and 
that defendants were not entitled to any damages. The trial court, therefore, 
determined that the County was the "substantially prevailing party" under the Lease 
provisions and was entitled to its reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs incurred 
during the entire case. On the second appeal, the court of appeals held that the County 
1
 The trial court determined that plaintiff Cache County prevailed on summary 
judgment but awarded defendants their attorneys' fees and court costs because "it was [Cache] 
County's fault that this matter was brought in the first place." The County did not appeal the 
trial court's award of attorneys' fees and court costs to defendants for the summary judgment 
proceedings, nor did the County seek review of the court of appeals' award of attorneys' fees 
to defendants on the first appeal. 
9 
was entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and court costs incurred that were 
"attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights," not including the fees 
incurred with respect to its motion for summary judgment that the County had not 
breached the Lease, which was unsuccessful, and its unsuccessful appeal in Cache 
County L In short, the breach of lease issue was decided as a matter of law on 
summary judgment and an appeal from that summary judgment and the County lost at 
both levels. Cache County v. Beus did not involve a situation where a party was 
unsuccessful on summary judgment in dismissing claims, but ultimately prevailed at 
trial on those claims and does not stand for the proposition that a party who ultimately 
prevails on a claim cannot recover fees incurred in seeking summary judgment on that 
claim. Rather, the only issue on which the County prevailed, and with respect to which 
it was thus entitled to attorneys' fees, was the issue of whether the County had 
substantially complied with the Lease, which issue was considered by the trial court on 
remand after the first appeal. In the case at bar, Burton Lumber is entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees with respect to claims on which it was ultimately successful. 
Furthermore, in Cache County v. Beus, the Lease was the only basis for an award of 
attorneys' fees and the court of appeals recognized that Cache County was "entitled 
only to those fees attributable to the successful vindication of contractual rights." In the 
case at bar, the court has determined that in addition to the contractual provision Burton 
Lumber is entitled to attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 and that all of 
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Burton Lumber's fees were incurred because of Graham's bad faith assertion of all of 
his counterclaims and his defenses to Burton Lumber's claims except his defenses to 
Burton Lumber's fraud and improper expense reimbursement claims. Therefore, for 
this additional reason, the attorneys' fees incurred by Burton Lumber in connection 
with its summary judgment motion are recoverable except those fees incurred with 
respect to the fraud and improper expense reimbursement claims. 
4. Promax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, cited by 
Graham, is not applicable in the case at bar. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court 
awarded the Railes their attorneys' fees in defending their judgment on appeal. 
However, the Railes had moved to dismiss the appeal as not being timely filed. The 
Supreme Court ruled against the Railes on that issue, determining that the appeal had in 
fact been timely filed. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Railes were not 
entitled to recover fees incurred with respect to their unsuccessful motion to dismiss the 
appeal because they had not prevailed on that issue. Promax was not a case where a 
party unsuccessfully moved to dismiss a claim, but ultimately prevailed in dismissing 
the claim at trial. In the case at bar, the court has not awarded any attorneys' fees with 
respect to the issues on which Burton Lumber did not prevail. However, Burton 
Lumber ultimately prevailed on all issues except Burton Lumber's fraud and improper 
expense reimbursement claim. 
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Punitive Damages 
5. In determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against 
Graham, the court has considered the seven factors listed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109 (1998): (1) Graham's relative wealth; (2) 
the nature of Graham's conduct; (3) the facts and circumstances surrounding Graham's 
conduct; (4) the effect thereof on Burton Lumber; (5) the probability of future 
recurrence of the misconduct; (6) the relationship of the parties; and (7) the amount of 
actual damages awarded. 
6. Based on these factors, punitive damages should be awarded against Graham 
in the amount of $34,000.00. 
DATED this / / ^ d a y of August, 2006. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on 
the-J^ day of July, 2006: 
David G. Harlow, Esq. 
1855 North Oak Lane 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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ADDENDUM C 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED FEBRUARY 11,2004 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
RLED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Ua;i County, State of Utah 
Deputy 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010404278 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
/°WU^KAJL 
Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company's ("Burton Lumber") motion for 
partial summary judgment came on for hearing before the court, The Honorable Claudia 
Laycock, Judge, on November 20, 2003. Stephen B. Mitchell of Burbidge & Mitchell 
appeared on behalf of Burton Lumber. David G. Harlow appeared on behalf of 
Defendant Michael Graham ("Graham"). The court, having read and considered the 
papers filed in connection with the motion, having heard and considered the argument of 
counsel and having issued its Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
January 12,2004 granting the motion with respect to the First Claim for Relief of 
Graham's Counterclaim for unconscionability and Sixth Claim for Relief of Graham's 
Counterclaim for fraud, and denying the remainder of the motion, summary judgment is 
hereby entered in favor of Burton Lumber dismissing the First Claim for Relief of the 
Counterclaim for unconscionability and the Sixth Claim for Relief of the Counterclaim 
for fraud with prejudice. 
UNDISPUTED FINDINGS OF FACTS 
The court determines that the following facts with respect to the dismissed claims 
are established by the evidence without dispute: 
1. Graham actively negotiated the provisions of the Purchase Agreement (the 
"Contract") with Burton Lumber. For example, Graham refused to agree on a non-
competition provision in the Contract without substantial additional compensation that 
Burton Lumber was unwilling to pay. Accordingly, the non-competition provision was 
not included in the contract. 
2. Before the signing the Contract, Graham consulted with an attorney and a CPA 
concerning the Contract. 
3. The Contract provided for two types of payments to be made to Graham for the 
purchase of his business, Advanced Home Systems ("AHS"). First, Burton Lumber 
agreed to pay "an initial purchase price" that was the fair market value of the hard assets 
of AHS. Burton Lumber also agreed to pay a "contingent deferred purchase Price" that 
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gave Graham 50% of the net profits earned by Burton Lumber from the wall panel 
business during 2001, 2002 and 2003 up to a maximum purchase price of $500,000.00. 
4. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Burton Lumber agreed to pay Graham 
$54,175.00 for the fixed assets of the business. 
5. Burton Lumber also agreed to pay Graham an annual salary of $120,000.00 
(including bonus). 
6. Paragraph 7.2 of the Contract provided that in the event Graham was terminated 
for any reason he would no longer be entitled to receive the contingent deferred purchase 
price payments. 
7. When Burton Lumber purchased AHS, Graham became the General Manager 
and signed an acknowledgment that he was an employee-at-will and could be terminated 
at any time. 
8. Burton Lumber terminated Graham at a meeting on August 28, 2001. 
9. The Contract between Burton Lumber and Graham is not one-sided and does 
not shockingly favor either Burton Lumber of Graham. 
10. Burton Lumber and Graham had relatively equal bargaining strength. 
11. The Contract is not unconscionable. 
12. There is no evidence that Burton Lumber represented to Graham that it would 
only terminate Graham's employment for cause only or that Graham relied upon any such 
alleged representations to his detriment. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As a matter of law, the Contract is not unconscionable. Therefore, the First 
Claim for Relief of the First Amended Counterclaim should be dismissed. 
2. Graham has failed to plead or prove fraud with particularity and there is no 
evidence to support the fraud claim. Accordingly, the Sixth Claim for Relief of the First 
Amended Counterclaim should be dismissed. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the First Claim 
for Relief and Sixth Claim for Relief of the First Amended Counterclaim shall be, and 
hereby are, dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this /& day of / ^ £ ^ g ^ < ^ 2 0 0 4 . 
BY THE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on 
the y 7 ^ day of January, 2004: 
David G. Harlow, Esq. 
1855 North Oak Lane 
Provo, Utah 84604 
C \jg\BURTON LUMBERVPARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT wpd 
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ADDENDUM D 
JUDGMENT DATED NOVEMBER 7,2005 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-6677 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL GRAHAM, 
Defendant. 
This case came on for an eight-day bench trial before the Honorable Fred D. 
Howard, Fourth District Court Judge, beginning on November 15, 2004 and ending on 
April 20, 2005. The court having taken the matter under advisement, having previously 
entered its Ruling and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of Plaintiff Burton Lumber & Hardware Company and against Defendant 
Michael Graham as follows: 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
WW* 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 010404278 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
1. On the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action of the 
Amended Complaint for the sum of $5,841.57, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal 
rate from May 15, 2001, relating to the Hamlet check claim; $2,148.00, plus pre-
judgment interest at the legal rate from August 19, 2001, relating to the secret profits 
for renting generators claim; and $7,517.59, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate 
from August 28, 2001, with respect to Burton Lumber's personal property converted by 
Graham; 
2. The Third and Fourth Causes of Action of the Amended Complaint for fraud 
are dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; 
3. The Amended Counterclaim, and each purported claim for relief contained 
therein, is dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action; 
4. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined after a further hearing; 
5. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
herein in an amount to be subsequently determined; and 
6. Burton Lumber is entitled to recover its taxable costs incurred herein. 
DATED this y& day ofjuty, 2005. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following on 
the *3& day ofltriy, 2005: 
David G. Harlow, Esq. 
1855 North Oak Lane 
Provo, Utah 84604 
P \JGlines\Clients\BURTON LUMBERXJUDGMENT wpd 
ADDENDUM E 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO. AND MICHAEL GRAHAM DATED 
FEBRUARY 28,2001 
AGREEMENT 
This Agreement entered into as of the 28 th day of February 2001 by and between Burton 
Lumber & Hardware Co. (referred to in this Agreement as "Buyer"), and Michael Graham, 
owner of a sole proprietorship known as Advanced Home Systems (referred to in this Agreement 
as "Seller or Graham"). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Seller is presently in the business of doing construction and operating a 
panelizing plant in Utah County (herein the "Business"); and 
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to purchase all of the assets of Seller and acquire the business 
operations of Seller. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the representations, warranties, covenants and 
agreements contained herein, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the 
parties agree as follows: 
1. Sale and Transfer of Assets. Seller shall sell, transfer, convey and deliver to Buyer 
at the Closing provided for at Paragraph 3 hereof, all of the following assets owned by Seller and 
used in the Business (hereinafter collectively the "Assets"): 
1. i Fixed Assets. All assets shown on a separate asset schedule to be prepared by 
Seller which includes all equipment, fixtures, machinery, tools, furniture, furnishings, shop 
supplies, inventory, and all other tangible personal property, use and located at the Business (the 
"Fixed Assets"). The Fixed Assets shall be free and clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances 
and shall not be subject to lease or conditional sales agreements 
1.2 Inventory. All Inventory held by Seller for re-sale at the Business as of the 
Closing Date (the "Inventory"). The Inventory shall be conveyed in merchantable condition and 
shall be free and clear of all liens and encumbrances at the Closing Date. 
1.3 Purchase Orders and Sale Contracts. All of Seller's rights in and to any 
purchase orders and sales contracts in process as of the Closing Date. A list of the purchase 
orders and sales contracts shall be delivered at the Closing. 
1.4 Intangible Assets. The following intangible assets: All plans, files, customer 
lists, and information relating to Seller's customers; employee lists; the telephone listing and 
telephone number for Seller, Seller's post office box, and all warranty and contract rights 
associated with the Assets (the "Intangible Assets"). The rights in such Intangible Assets shall 
not be subject to any claims or encumbrances or liens of any type and shall be conveyed without 
reservation of rights. 
I EXHIBIT I 
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1.5 Accounts Receivable and Payable. Seller shall retain all of his accounts 
receivable. It is understood that under no circumstances shall Buyer be entitled to collect any of 
these accounts receivable. Seller shall be responsible to pay all of his accounts payable on or 
before the date of closing. It is understood that under no circumstances shall Buyer be 
responsible to pay any of these accounts payable. 
1.6 Excluded Assets. Except for accounts receivable and personal assets of 
Graham such as his home, furniture, cars, and clothing there are no excluded assets. Buyer is 
purchasing all assets of Seller. 
1.7 Title. Seller shall sell and convey good and marketable title to the Assets, 
free and clear of any liabilities, obligations, liens and encumbrances. The tangible personal 
property described herein shall be conveyed by Bill of Sale, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit A. Transfers of contracts and agreements shall be by a simple assignment. 
1.8 Panelizing Division. After closing, Buyer shall establish a Panelizing 
Division where Michael Graham will work. Buyer will separately track profits earned and/or 
losses incurred by this Division on, at least, a quarterly basis. 
1.9 Cessation of Advanced Home Systems Business. After closing, Advanced 
Home Systems will immediately cease doing business. From the date of closing forward, any 
panelizing business previously performed by Advanced Home Systems and/or Michael Graham 
personally will then be performed by the Panelizing Division of Buyer. This does not preclude 
Graham from transferring Advanced Home Systems' Contractor's license to his personal name. 
2. Purchase Price and Payment. The purchase price for the assets and payment 
therefor shall be as follows: 
2.1 Initial Purchase Price. Seller shall provide Buyer with a list of all assets to be 
purchased by Buyer as set forth in paragraph 1 above at least 5 days prior to Closing. The list 
(asset schedule) shall specify Seller's estimated fair market value for the assets. At Closing 
Buyer shall pay Seller an agreed upon price for the fair market value of the assets. If the parties 
cannot agree upon the value of the assets, no Closing will take place and this agreement will be 
null and void. 
2.2 Contingent Deferred Purchase Price. 50% of the pretax profits of Buyer's 
Panelizing Division will be paid to Seller annually in February of each year for the three year 
period beginning January 1, 2001 and ending December 31, 2003. The February payments will 
be for profits earned from January 1 through December 31 of the preceding year. However, if 
there are no profits during a particular period, Graham will be entitled to no additional money 
during that period. Annual losses incurred by the Panelizing Division, if any, will be rolled 
forward and will offset future annual profits. If Seller receives $500,000 from Buyer before the 
three year period specified herein expires, including the moneys paid pursuant to paragraph 2.1 
above, Seller shall be entitled to no additional compensation hereunder. In other words, it is 
understood and agreed the $500,000 is the maximum that Seller will ever receive from Buyer for 
the sale of his business. Payments specified above are subject to and governed by the provisions 
of Paragraph 7.4 hereof. 
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3. Closing. The Closing of this transaction shall take place at 2220 So. State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah on or before March 6, 2001, (The "Closing Date"), or at such other time or place 
as may be agreed upon by the parties. At the Closing: 
3.1 Bill of Sale. Seller shall execute and deliver the Bill of Sale to Buyer. 
3.2 Assignment of Intangible Assets. Seller shall deliver to Buyer assignments of 
such contracts, agreements and rights as may be deemed reasonably necessary by Buyer to effect 
the transfer of the Intangible Assets. 
3.3 Assumption of Lease. Seller shall provide Buyer with a copy of the lease for 
the property and building that Seller is currently utilizing at least 5 days prior to closing. If 
agreeable to Buyer, Buyer shall assume all of Seller's obligations under the lease at the time of 
closing. 
3.4 Further Assurances. From time to time after the Closing, Seller and Buyer 
shall, at the reasonable request of either party and without further consideration, execute and 
deliver such other bills of sale, assignments, consents, releases, assurances in law, assumptions, 
and other instruments as the parties may reasonably deem necessary or desirable to vest, perfect 
or confirm title to any of the assets or rights acquired by reason of the transaction described in 
this Agreement, or to put Buyer in possession of any of the Assets, or to confirm the nature of 
the transaction, assumption of obligations or otherwise as required. 
3.5 Records and Information. Seller will provide to Buyer copies of such of 
Seller's business records as may reasonably be required by Buyer for the conduct of its on-going 
business. 
4. Representations and Warranties of Seller. Seller hereby represents and warrants to 
Buyer that: 
4.1 Legal Existence. Advanced Home Systems is a sole proprietorship owned 
exclusively by Michael Graham, is in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah, is duly 
qualified to transact business in the State of Utah, and has all powers and all material 
government licenses, authorizations, consents and approvals required to carry on business as it is 
now conducted. 
4.2 Ability to Carry Out Agreement. Seller is not a party to, subject to, or bound 
by any agreement, judgment, order, writ, injunction or decree of any court or government body 
which could prevent or materially impair the carrying out of this Agreement for the sale of the 
Assets. 
4.3 Binding Effect. This Agreement constitutes a valid and binding agreement of 
Seller. When executed, the conveyance of the Assets will transfer title to the Assets, free and 
clear of any liens, claims and encumbrances. 
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4.4 Financial Information. Seller has provided to Buyer such of its unaudited 
financial information as requested by Buyer upon which Buyer has relied for purposes of 
entering into this Agreement. 
4.5 Conduct of Business Prior to Closing. Except as otherwise provided herein 
or agreed to in writing by Buyer, on and after the date of this Agreement and until the Closing 
Date, Seller will carry on its business and activities in substantially the same manner as 
heretofore and will not make and has not made any purchases, sales or agreements therefor, or 
introduced any method of management or operation in respect to its business and its activities or 
its assets, except for purchases of inventory in the ordinary course of its business and sales 
thereof Seller will use its purchases of inventory in the ordinary course of its business and sales 
thereof. Seller will use its reasonable efforts to maintain and preserve its business organization 
intact and maintain its relationships with employees, suppliers and customers and others having 
business relations with it, so that they will be preserved for Buyer on and after the Closing Date. 
Further, Seller will not make any changes or modifications in any of the contracts it has, except 
in the ordinary course of business. 
4.6 Payment of Taxes and Other Obligations of Seller. Seller shall pay when due 
all current and past due liabilities relating to his business or operations. At the time of closing, 
Seller will not owe any taxes or any other debts to any other creditors associated in any way with 
his business. Seller shall further perform and take any and all actions as may be required of 
Seller under the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Specifically, Seller shall compile or 
assist in the compilation of any and all lists or information required to be provided by Seller 
pursuant to this Agreement. 
4.7 Employees. Seller shall assist Buyer in maintaining the relations and 
employment of the employees of Seller to the extent requested by Buyer. 
5. Representations and Warranties of Buyer. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller 
that: 
5.1 Organization. Buyer is a corporation organized, validly existing, and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
5.2 Authorization and Approval of Agreement. Buyer's board of directors has 
authorized the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement by Buyer. This 
Agreement, when executed, shall constitute the binding obligation of Buyer. 
5.3 Ability to Carry Out Agreement. Buyer is not a party to, subject to, or bound 
by, any agreement, judgment, order, writ, injunction, or decree of any court or governmental 
body that, when enforced, would prevent the carrying out of this Agreement. 
6. Survival of Representations and Warranties. Notwithstanding any investigation 
made at any time by or on behalf of any of the parties, all of the covenants, representations, 
warranties, agreements and undertakings contained in this Agreement and in any separate 
instruments delivered hereunder, shall survive the Closing Date. 
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7. Employment Issues. Following closing, Buyer shall employ Graham subject to the 
following conditions: 
7.1 Employees at Will. Graham is an employee at will who, at the time of 
closing, shall sign a separate Acknowledgement that is attached hereto as Exhibit B. The parties 
understand and agree that nothing contained in this Agreement or in any other document shall 
have the effect of altering or changing Graham's status as an employee at will. 
7.2 Compensation. Graham shall be paid a salary of $60,000 per year plus a 
bonus of $15,000 per quarter during the time he is employed by Buyer. Graham must be 
employed by Buyer at the time a bonus is due to be entitled to receive the bonus. Bonuses will be 
paid in April, July, October, and January for the quarters ending March 31, June 30, September 
30, and December 31. Additionally, Buyer will lease a truck for Graham's use at a price not to 
exceed $40,000 within 30 days from the date of Closing. If Graham quits his employment with 
Seller, he shall have no right to continue to use of the truck and must surrender possession of the 
truck to Buyer immediately. If Graham is fired without just cause, he shall be entitled to keep the 
truck and Buyer will deliver title to the truck to him free and clear of all liens and/or 
encumbrances. The payment of salaries and bonuses specified herein are in addition to any 
payments Graham is entitled to receive under the provisions of paragraph 2.2 above. 
7.3 Best Efforts. Graham will use his best efforts to insure the success of the 
Burton Lumber Panelizing Division. He shall work full time for Seller, and shall not work in 
other business pursuits. 
7.4 Termination of Employment. If the employment of Graham is terminated for 
any reason, he will immediately forfeit any unpaid portion of the remaining contingent deferred 
purchase price specified in Paragraph 2.2 above, plus he will no longer be entitled to any 
continuing salary, allowances, and bonuses. 
8. Expenses and Fees. The parties agree that they shall each pay their own respective 
expenses, including, without limitation, fees, disbursements and expenses of their attorneys, 
accountants, and advisors in connection with the negotiation and preparation of this Agreement 
and the transactions contemplated by it. Neither party has engaged a broker, consultant or other 
person who is owed a fee as a result of the consummation of this Agreement. To the extent 
either party shall incur a fee from any broker or consultant pursuant to this Agreement, the party 
who has incurred the fee or expense shall indemnify and hold harmless the other from any claims 
or costs resulting therefrom. 
9 Indemnity. All of the representations, warranties, and covenants in this Agreement 
and the obligations of the parties with respect thereto shall survive the Closing. Seller agrees 
that he will indemnify, defend, protect and hold harmless Buyer and its employees from and 
against all liabilities, claims, damages, actions, demands, assessments, adjustments, penalties, 
losses, costs and expenses whatsoever (including court costs and attorneys' fees) that arise as a 
result of or incident to the following: occurrences before the Closing Date; any breach of, 
misrepresentation in, untruth in or inaccuracy in the representations and warranties by Seller; 
non-fulfillment or nonperformance of any agreement, covenant or condition on the part of Seller 
made in this Agreement or an any other document delivered pursuant to this Agreement. 
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10. Miscellaneous. 
10.1 Notices. Any notice or other communication required or permitted 
hereunder shall be in writing and shall be delivered personally, sent by Facsimile transmission or 
sent by certified, registered or express mail, postage prepaid. Any such notice shall be deemed 
given when so delivered personally, or sent by facsimile transmission or, if mailed, four (4) days 
after the date of deposit in the United States mails, as follows: 
If to Buyer To: 
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. 
ATTN: Robert A. Burton 
2220 So. State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
If to Seller To: 
Michael Graham 
Any party may, by notice given in accordance with this Paragraph to the other parties, designate 
another address or person for receipt of notice hereunder. 
10.2 Entire Agreement. The Agreement contains the entire agreement among the 
parties and supersedes all prior agreements, written or oral, with respect thereto. 
10.3 Waivers and Amendments: Non-Contractual Remedies: Preservation of 
Remedies. This Agreement may be amended, superseded, canceled, renewed or extended, and 
the terms hereof may be waived, only by a written instrument signed by the parties or, in the case 
of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. No delay on the part of any party in exercising 
any right, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof. Nor shall any waiver 
on the part of any party of any such right, power or privilege, nor any single or partial exercise of 
any such right, power or privilege, preclude any further exercise thereof or the exercise thereof 
of any other such right, power or privilege. The rights and remedies herein provided are 
cumulative and are not exclusive of any rights or remedies that any party may otherwise have at 
law or in equity. The rights and remedies of any party based upon, arising out of or otherwise in 
respect of any inaccuracy in or breach of any representation, warranty, covenant or agreement 
contained in this Agreement shall in no way be limited by the fact that the act, omission, 
occurrence or other state of facts upon which any claim of any such inaccuracy or breach is 
based may also be the subject matter of any other representation, warranty, covenant or 
agreement contained in this Agreement (or in any other agreement between the parties) as to 
which there is no inaccuracy or breach. 
10.4 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
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10.5 Binding Effect; No Assignment. This Agreement shall be binding upon and 
inure to the benefit of the parties and their respective successors and assigns and legal 
representatives. This Agreement is not assignable except by operation of law. 
10.6 No Third Party Beneficiaries. Nothing in this Agreement is intended or 
shall be construed to give any person, other than the parties hereto, any legal or equitable right, 
remedy or claims under or in respect of this Agreement or any provision contained herein. 
10 7 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed by the parties hereto in 
separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be an original, but all 
such counterparts shall together constitute one and the same instrument. Each counterpart may 
consist of a number of copies hereof each signed by less than all, but together signed by all of the 
parties hereto. 
10.8 Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for reference only, and shall 
not affect the interpretation of this Agreement. 
10.9. Survival of Representations and Warranties. All representations, 
warranties, agreements, covenants and obligations herein or in any schedule, certificate or 
financial statement delivered by Seller to Buyer incident to the transactions contemplated hereby 
are material, shall be deemed to have been relied upon by the other parties, shall survive the 
execution hereof regardless of any investigation and shall not merge in the performance of any 
obligation by any party hereto. 
10.10. Severability. If any provisions of this Agreement shall be held to be 
invalid, illegal or unenforceable, the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining 
provisions shall not in any way be affected or impaired thereby. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed or have caused this Agreement to be 
signed by their respective officers who are duly authorized. 
BUYER: 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE CO. 
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EXHIBIT A 
GEiNERAL CONVEYANCE, ASSIGNMENT AND BELL OF SALE 
Effective as of March 6, 2001, Michael Graham ("Grantor"), for good and valuable 
consideration and pursuant to that Purchase and Sale of Assets Agreement dated as of March 6, 
2001 (the "Purchase Agreement"), between Graham and Burton Lumber and Hardware Co., 
("Grantee"), hereby sells, assigns, transfers, conveys and delivers to Grantee all of Grantor's 
right, title and interest in all of the Assets (except for the Accounts Receivable). 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all such Assets unto Grantee and its successors and assigns 
to and for its or their use forever. 
Grantor and Grantee shall execute and deliver, at the request of the other, such farther 
instruments of transfer, and shall take or cause to be taken such other or further actions, as shall 
reasonably be requested for purposes of carrying out the Transactions. 
This General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill of Sale is delivered pursuant to Section 
1.7 of the Purchase Agreement and shall be construed consistently with the Purchase Agreement. 
Capitalized terms used in this instrument shall have the meanings given them in the Purchase 
Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Grantor and Grantee have executed and delivered this 
General Conveyance, Assignment and Bill of Sale effective as of the date first above written. 
Grantor: 
i 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I have received a copy of the Company's Policies, Practices, 
Benefits and Programs Manual dated December 1, 1997, and I 
understand its contents. I agree to adhere to the policies and 
practices set forth in the manual. 
I understand that the manual is intended to provide an 
overview of the Company's policies and procedures and does not 
necessarily represent all such policies or procedures. 
I understand, further, that the Company may unilaterally, at 
any time, without notice to me, add, delete, or alter any 
policies, procedures, benefits or programs in and at its sole 
discretion. I understand that nothing in the Company's manual 
guarantees me employment with the Company for any set period of 
time, in any specific position, or at any specific rate of pay. 
I understand that my employment and compensation are for no 
fixed term and that my employment is "at-will" and may be 
terminated by the Company at any time with or without cause or 
notice. I also understand that the company is not legally bound 
to follow any guideline concerning warnings or other procedures 
connected with any disciplinary action, including but not limited 
to termination, that the Company may wish to take with respect to 
my employment. 
I also acknowledge that there are no oral or written 
understandings or agreements with respect to any aspect of my 
employment with the company. I agree that no oral statements 
made by anyone may ever constitute an agreement or understanding 
with respect to my employment which c^uitf^evex^alter my status as 
an "at-will" employee. 
DATE : 
SIGNATURE: 
PRINT NAME: 
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